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USSR REPORT

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 10, October 1984

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BOGDANOV ASSAILS U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE POLICY AS RELYING ON FORCE

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[Article by R. G. Bogdanov: "Parity or 'Deterrence'?"]

[Text] Since the end of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's the threat of nuclear war has occupied a prime place among the global problems of the contemporary era. The main cause of this danger is the unprecedented arms race which has been whipped up by the United States and NATO. It is a fearful race aimed at gaining military superiority over the Soviet Union and fulfilling the hegemonist plans of the United States. Here, of course, we are referring to the deployment of new American nuclear missiles in Western Europe and also to America's noticeable swing toward the use of military force as the main means of achieving world hegemony. This kind of buildup in military might by the United States and the other NATO countries is being implemented for the first time in the whole of postwar history. According to available calculations, over the whole postwar period the United States has spent more than a trillion dollars on nuclear weapons alone; and over the next 6 years the Reagan Administration plans to spend approximately 500 billion dollars on this.¹

President R. Reagan and his closest advisers are trying to instill the idea that nuclear war is permissible and that this kind of war can be won. In particular, Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger has repeatedly stated that neither he nor President Reagan agrees with the view that it is impossible to win a nuclear war. Pentagon leaders have spoken very definitely in favor of a "limited" and even a "protracted" nuclear war. And the attempts to erase the views and beliefs of the administration and of the President himself from the public memory with the aid of peaceful rhetoric are futile. These views and beliefs are not a subject for rhetorical exercises, but real facts. They have been given a material basis.

The world has seen the aggressive concepts of the Reagan Administration in action. The United States occupied Grenada, is waging an undeclared and insidious war in Central America and is engaging in brigandage in other parts of the world. Washington is pursuing a policy of confrontation, aspiring to military superiority, pursuing a policy of force, interference in the internal affairs of other countries and the infringement of the national independence and sovereignty of states and striving to acquire new "spheres of influence."

Hotbeds of tension are being stirred up and new conflicts and crises are being provoked in various parts of the world. A new and monstrous danger is being created--a threat from outer space.

It is not surprising that the problem of war and peace is one of the most serious problems of our day. After outlining the Peace Program for the 1980's, the 26th CPSU Congress clearly defined the main long-term directions of the party's foreign policy activities: "Defending peace--today there is no task more important on the international level for our party, our people and all other people on earth."² In February 1984 K. U. Chernenko, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, noted that we have not deviated one step from the policy of ridding mankind of the threat of nuclear world war. "This Leninist policy of peace...is in the vital interest of the Soviet people and, in fact, of all other people on earth."³

The deep-rooted causes of imperialism's increased aggressiveness lie in the fact that its former power over countries and continents is slipping away from it and its positions in the world have been seriously weakened. And this is taking place against the background of the growth and reinforcement of the forces of socialism. The main force in the capitalist world, the United States, has found itself in a difficult position. The American economy has ceased to be omnipotent in the capitalist world. American policies have suffered serious defeats in various regions. A special feature of the contemporary situation is the pervasive influence of the rivalry between the three main centers of imperialism (the United States, Western Europe and Japan). American economic and political hegemony in the capitalist world has been replaced by polycentrism, while the United States' military predominance has been retained with its global structure of nuclear bases and occupying troops.

The qualitatively new situation in the world frightens many influential members of U.S. ruling circles and deprives them of moral balance and self-confidence. They are prepared to go to any lengths to put a brake on the changes that are taking place and to reverse the inexorable wheel of history. It is precisely for this reason that a particular danger is now posed by the most reactionary and bellicose groups perceiving these changes with hysteria and threatening the world with nuclear war. They are prepared to stake the vital interests of mankind on a chance to attain their selfish aims.

For a number of reasons it was this kind of group that came to power in Washington after the 1980 elections. It openly proclaimed its aim to be the disruption of the global military-strategic balance. The intention of this group was to weaken the Soviet Union and other socialist countries by means of coordinated and simultaneous pressure in the economic, political and military spheres, to force these countries to make concessions to imperialism, to simultaneously roll back the forces of national and social liberation and, wherever possible, to destroy these forces with the help of hirelings like the counterrevolutionaries in Central America or the Israeli aggressors in Lebanon. The ultimate aim was to win back its lost world positions. At the same time the American ruling class, completely ignoring the interests of its allies, tried to crush its "class comrades" and to subordinate their policies to the hegemonist, imperial plans of the United States. Ronald Reagan and his

followers proclaim brute force as the pivot of all their policies. In the minds of the ideologists of "Reaganism," the task lies in building up military might while simultaneously whipping up anticommunist hysteria.

But military force is not a means of resolving the problems of the contemporary world. The Reagan Administration is ignoring the fact that security in the nuclear age is one aspect of foreign policy and cannot be viewed in isolation from other problems. Washington has also forgotten that a state which relies on military might as the first and only alternative is doomed to continual failure. The example of Vietnam showed that the use of military force does not always ensure victory. Concentrated American military aid was also unable to keep the Iranian shah in power.

Gambling on crude force sometimes has a boomerang effect and leads to results which run counter to U.S. interests. The Reagan Administration's efforts to give its foreign policy an ultra-ideological thrust, having completely subordinated it to the struggle against communism, are also futile. This is the reason for all of the flimsy attempts to connect all popular actions against social injustice with "a Moscow plot" or "international terrorism." This carries little weight even in the eyes of the U.S. allies, who ask: Is it not as a result of U.S. support that repressive, terrorist regimes remain in power in a number of countries? Is it not the Reagan Administration that has elevated international terrorism to the rank of state policy by mining Nicaraguan ports in a time of peace, dropping thousand-kilogram shells on Lebanese villages and crushing Grenada's independence by means of brute force?

Mankind has already lived through the period known in history as the "cold war." This war was initiated by those groups of U.S. ruling circles who saw an opportunity in the postwar political and economic situation (and primarily in their acquisition of nuclear weapons) to advance toward world supremacy as soon as they had crushed the main obstacle in their way--the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community.

The "cold war," which lasted for more than two decades, was repeatedly accompanied by bloody clashes on various scales and in various parts of the world which had been provoked by American aggressive actions. Some American political scientists believe that the winning of the White House by the "Reagan team" goes far beyond the bounds of simply replacing the Democrats with the Republicans at the helm of power. For example, in the words of the well-known American political scientist S. Hoffman, "American foreign policy has passed through two complete cycles since the end of World War II. It has experienced the cold war and detente. And now we have obviously gone back to the first of these stages."⁴ Hoffman admits that the reaction of U.S. ruling circles to the profound changes which have taken place in the world in recent years is evident in this. Never before has the United States experienced such a severe crisis, a crisis which is affecting various spheres, as at the present time, now that "America is in trouble in the country and abroad."⁵

Having failed to achieve its set aims, the United States is now experiencing a deep moral, political and economic crisis, which has intensified the process by which its leadership is being undermined in the capitalist world. It has lost its dictatorial and hegemonist positions in relation to its allies.

Having developed an unprecedented arms race, it has achieved the reverse results: Its own territory has become just as vulnerable as the territory of other countries. For the first time it has come up against the danger of experiencing the dangers of war at first hand, and not an ordinary war but a thermonuclear one.

It would seem that recent events had left no illusions regarding the lack of prospects in "cold war" policies--permanent confrontation with the Soviet Union. At the same time, the decade of detente demonstrated the fruitful and constructive nature of the policy of peaceful coexistence, as well as its usefulness for all countries and peoples without exception. This experience acquires still greater significance in the era of the nuclear weapon, which represents the same threat to states with different social systems and which would put the very survival of the human race in question. It is precisely for this reason that the concentration of Soviet efforts on preventing a thermonuclear catastrophe and strengthening peace and cooperation between states is an expression of the peaceful Soviet foreign policy and the great humanitarianism of the socialist society.

In the present international situation this aim has become feasible as a result of the alteration in the balance of power and the achievement of approximate parity in the military sphere between the USSR and the United States, and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries. This has been a most important objective factor in making the policy of detente possible and placing it on the agenda. The consistently peaceful foreign policy of the USSR has laid a firm foundation of trust in the Soviet State on the part of the general public in all countries. The presence of realistic-minded groups of the elite in ruling circles in the capitalist countries, including the citadel of imperialism, the United States--groups with a clearer understanding of the existing balance of power and of the absence of an alternative to peaceful coexistence now that the nuclear threat is hanging over mankind--should obviously be counted among the positive subjective factors in this situation. These groups came to the forefront of U.S. politics at the end of the 1960's and early 1970's.

The American ruling class took shape as U.S. capitalism developed and turned into imperialism at the end of the 19th century. It absorbed the historical and national features of the country's capitalist development. All of this, as well as America's geographic location, is directly reflected in the nature of the ruling class' line of reasoning, its views of the outside world and its actions within the country and in the international arena. Here we should recall V. I. Lenin's statement that "if one examines any social phenomenon in the process of its development, one will always find vestiges of the past, foundations of the present and rudiments of the future."⁶

Turning to American history, we see that it has always been characteristic of the U.S. political elite to join forces within the framework of fairly broad political coalitions for the purpose of fulfilling certain aims, the aims it regards as the most important at a specific moment of historical development. By virtue of the particular nature of this development, these coalitions have formed on the basis of either the Republican or the Democratic party, and it is precisely these coalitions that have brought this or that party to power.

While fulfilling the main task within the country in the interests of strengthening and developing capitalism and opposing other states--in our era primarily the countries of socialism--outside the country, representatives of certain segments of the ruling elite have chosen the appropriate tactics of struggle depending on the existing situation and correlation of forces.

In this respect, antagonism within the ruling elite itself has had an effect. In those cases when the upper hand has been gained by its aggressive elements, primarily those connected with the military-industrial complex and not wishing to take account of realities in the surrounding world, they have brought matters to the point of exacerbating the situation, leading the development of events to a dangerous point. In certain, very rare cases, however, considerable influence has been exerted by realistic-minded elements which have come to realize the catastrophic consequences of this course.

The concrete directions of their foreign and military policies, which are frequently of a very conflicting nature, also take shape in the process of the struggle between these two main trends in the U.S. ruling class.

There have been periods in U.S. political life when fairly homogeneous groups have been in power and have set themselves the aim of pursuing a given course. But the homogeneity of these groups and the uniformity of their course have been of a relative nature, since the existence and interaction of factions opposed to one another along various parameters are characteristic of American politics. An apt remark on this point can be found in the works of F. Engels: "On this vast territory (the United States--R. B.) the difference in interests is so vast, even within one and the same class, that, depending on locality, totally diverse groups and interests can be represented by each of the two major parties...and, to a very considerable extent, every stratum of the propertied class has its own representatives in both parties."⁷ They struggle amongst themselves but they also need one another. The relative balance between them or the preeminence of one faction over another is reflected in the course pursued by each administration in foreign and military policies.

The concrete correlation of forces within the country's monopolist capital lies at the basis of the division of the U.S. ruling class into different groups. This correlation is subject to change and reflects the influence of a given group, which has either shot forward or has come to a standstill and is lagging behind. In the final analysis, the economic correlation of forces finds indirect and complex expression in the country's political arena. The members of the groups with the most influence at a given time take possession of the White House and the machinery of state.

However, the complexity of this process and its diverse and multifaceted nature should be noted. Various mechanisms ("branches") of power--executive, judicial and legislative--serve as component parts in the functioning of the American machinery of state. They were thought up by the "Founding Fathers" as a balanced system of machinery. The main point of the principle of mutual balance between branches of power is to maintain the equilibrium of the U.S. capitalist system in general and to prevent the absolute supremacy of a specific segment of capital: This would threaten the stability and development of the

entire system. According to F. Engels' definition, a merging "into something between the two extremes, into one common resultant force," is taking place.⁸

There are various means of fulfilling certain foreign policy tasks in the arsenal of U.S. ruling circles. But the chief place among them is given to military means. Throughout the country's entire history, both Democrats and Republicans have participated in building up the military machine. It is precisely this military machine, aimed at gaining world hegemony, that has begun, in the postwar period, to subject the system of international relations to seemingly excessive pressure and has begun to destroy the traditional guarantees of international security. The appearance and further perfection of nuclear weapons lie at the basis of these destructive trends.

The overwhelming majority of elements in U.S. military policy, particularly nuclear policy, are actually of a bipartisan nature. This policy is guaranteed by a broad "consensus" and the unanimity of various segments of the ruling class. This reflects the general orientation of the American bourgeoisie to resolve problems by force, as well as its tendency to view the world through a gunsight and to regard the arms race as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the enemy and intimidating him. In turn, the mercenary philosophy of the U.S. ruling class, which has introduced the principles of destroying and crushing competitors into its policies, shows its admiration of force.

At all stages of history the American armed forces have been formed in accordance with the tasks set by the ruling class. Initially adapted to establish U.S. domination in the Western Hemisphere, they gradually grew into an instrument of global expansion. It was at the turn of the century, at the time of the transition to the imperialist stage of development (particularly after the victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898), that the shaping of a phenomenon began, a phenomenon now known as the American military machine. Thus the foundations of contemporary American militarism were laid. According to the definition of V. I. Lenin, "contemporary militarism is the result of capitalism. In both its forms it is a 'vital manifestation' of capitalism: both the military force the capitalist states use in their foreign clashes...and the weapon the dominant classes use to suppress any kind (economic or political) of proletarian movement."⁹

The formulation and perfection of the American military machine have basically taken place during armed conflicts with troops from other countries and with national-liberation and revolutionary movements. Without a formal declaration of war, the U.S. Armed Forces have been in action 199 times between 1789 and 1972.¹⁰ Since 1898 their use has approximately doubled each year.¹¹

The existence of a contemporary military machine which definitively took shape after World War II and the extensive propaganda of the policy of force have instilled a hypertrophied and considerably perverted attitude to the problems of war in the American mass mind. The colossal scales of the constantly growing military machine and its transformation into some kind of superorganism increase its influence on the overall functioning of the American machinery of state. The hypertrophy of the U.S. military machine is one of the most alarming phenomena of recent decades.

The gigantic growth of this machine, which has been accompanied by the merging of the military elite within the U.S. ruling class and by the integration of its interests, has given birth to the stratum known in America as the "national security bureaucrats." It is in this milieu that plans for nuclear war against the USSR are working out and constantly perfected, and the "theoretical" foundations of victory in various forms of nuclear conflict are born, as well as concepts for the development and use of new weapon systems. This bureaucracy and its intellectual elite have been engaged for many years in the formulation of the aggressive aspirations and plans of the ruling class, particularly its most bellicose flank--the military-industrial complex.

Immediately after World War II the American public demanded a return to normal life. This signified the dismantling of the military machine, at least to its prewar scale, but this was impossible without overcoming the opposition of the military and destroying the vast military mechanism with its long tentacles reaching into all spheres of life. During this period, attempts to prevent--despite the public's wishes--the dismantling of the American military machine began to find increasing support within certain political circles in the country. There was an eventual merger of the ambitious plans and intentions of the military and reactionary politicians, which was considerably strengthened by the existence of nuclear weapons opening up tempting prospects.

As has already happened on more than one occasion in American history, the U.S. ruling class reacted in its own way to the changing situation in the world. During the postwar period it advanced figures to power who had demonstrated their willingness to utilize the situation, with the aid of a broad range of means, primarily means of force, in the selfish interests of the American ruling class.

The same stratum took steps to utilize the military machine for the fulfillment of new global, hegemonist aims. The main decision was to increase the portion of the gross national product which the U.S. bourgeoisie was prepared to allocate for the purpose of strengthening and promoting the functioning of the military machine under these new conditions. There were also opponents of this policy in the country--realistic-minded members of the ruling class who were striving to maintain a certain level of cooperation with the Soviet Union. At the same time the increase in military expenditure was also opposed by advocates of "cheap defense" who were striving to ensure American hegemony in the world basically with the help of nuclear weapons. Differences also existed over other questions of military construction.

The differences reflect a characteristic feature of postwar U.S. foreign policy--the struggle between two trends. The first trend is aggressive and that of a superpower. The second is more realistic, based on an understanding of objective changes in the world and attempting to adapt the country's policies to current changes. The first trend has predominated in the postwar period. As a result the contemporary military machine has been formed on the basis of the merging of the three forms of armed forces (the Army, Navy and Air Force) and also on the basis of the system, which relies on it, of so-called national security, made up of many government agencies. A unique association has been formed by the civilian military bureaucracy, including the intellectual

academic elite, and the business community, which is flourishing on account of preparations for war. This alliance is commonly known as the military-industrial complex. As a highly complex formation, it has gradually turned into a unique directorate controlling the U.S. machinery of state and influencing, sometimes decisively, the formation, substantiation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy.

The well-known American sociologist C. Wright Mills has noted with complete justification that this unique directorate is considerably outside the framework of the democratic process, even in its bourgeois interpretation. The members of this directorate have not been elected but have appeared of themselves or have been nominated from above. Consequently, they are responsible only to themselves or to their chiefs. Congress has virtually no power over them, and American public opinion has no power at all.

It should be noted, however, that the U.S. ruling class as a whole implements fairly rigid control over the functioning of the military machine. The aim of this control is to ensure the optimal functioning of the military-political mechanism, to prevent undesirable malfunctions and rivalry and to check excessively intriguing military leaders. Since it is in the general interest of the ruling elite, the ruling echelon of the military machine actively cooperates with the civilian political leadership.

In the present situation F. Engels' observations on the state of affairs in the United States are very relevant: "But who can count on an even course of development in America! There the same leaps are taken in economic life as in political life in France and, of course, the same temporary regressive steps."¹² This can be applied not only to the American economy but also to American politics.

The turn toward global confrontation, clearly apparent with the Reagan Administration's assumption of power, exerts a strong negative influence on the development of contemporary international relations and the world situation in general. This administration is pathologically obsessed with building new missiles, bombers and aircraft carriers and is experimenting with new weapons of mass destruction.

Strictly speaking, U.S. ruling circles have used military force as their chief policy instrument throughout history. This answers the aggressive plans of imperialism. The strategy of "deterrence" is still the central postulate of this policy.¹³ Militarist propaganda validates the strategy of "deterrence" by referring to the need to repel the "Soviet threat." In reality, however, the policy of "deterrence" does not help to prevent war. Rather, it promotes war, and it is basically an aggressive, and not defensive, strategy. This strategy has led the resolution of problems of international security into a deadlock.

At one time the United States' loss of the nuclear monopoly and then of nuclear superiority reduced American ruling circles to a state of shock. Faint signs of realism began to show in their military and political evaluations. Unfortunately, however, their main reaction was apparent in a further increase in aggressiveness and a more active search for refined technological

and tactical solutions. The 1960's and subsequent years were marked by the elaboration of war scenarios, the success of which, in the opinion of American strategists, would be ensured by the use of nuclear weapons. These scenarios were based on the illusory assumption that the American administration would be able to keep a nuclear war confined within the planned parameters and that it would be able to end such a war at the necessary moment at its own choice. These illusions were also based on the strange conviction that the Soviet leadership would adhere to the levels of escalation proposed by the American side. In other words, it would cede the initiative to the United States without putting up serious opposition.

From the point of view of the American "stagers" of future wars, the policy of "deterrence" is primarily a method of ensuring the economic and political interests of U.S. ruling circles. It is also a means of actively compelling the enemy--that is, the USSR--to conduct itself according to American canons in the use of nuclear weapons and in the search for strategic solutions. And, of course, "deterrence" envisages military superiority over the Soviet Union, since parity deprives plans for the use of nuclear weapons of rationality. Thus, "deterrence" has lain at the basis of the increasingly new spirals of the arms race, these spirals being aimed at gaining American superiority.¹⁴

In contemporary conditions the doctrine of "deterrence" is imbued with a spirit of adventurism. It attests to the fact that the militarist thinking of U.S. ruling circles has been struck by the most dangerous crisis. The "war party" in the White House, headed by President R. Reagan, cannot recognize and, perhaps as a result of its primitive anticommunism, is incapable of recognizing the special nature of a nuclear war. Its special nature lies in the fact that there is no objective possibility of concluding a nuclear war with a "traditional" outcome--the victory of one side and the defeat of the other. Unlike past wars, the use of nuclear weapons will only lead to a global catastrophe and to the destruction of all mankind.

Of course, suicide does not come into the calculations of the "war party." Having proclaimed a "crusade" against socialism as a social system, ultra-reactionary U.S. circles hope to break this system. It is dangerous that the illusory hopes of smashing socialism by military means have been given a nuclear missile basis. Hence the constant striving by adventurist elements in Washington to depict the nature of a nuclear war in such a way that, from the political point of view, its price would be acceptable to the United States. These American circles' senseless pursuit of the specter of military superiority is shaking the already fragile edifice of the contemporary world.

A realization of the combat strength of the Soviet Armed Forces--a powerful factor in restraining the nuclear ambitions of the "war party" in Washington--has led theorists of nuclear war to reinterpret the policy of "deterrence" in the last decade. They have begun to regard this policy as double-edged--in other words, as "mutual containment." The falsity of this interpretation lies in the fact that it permits the false motivation of some necessity to block the "Soviet military threat." But this threat does not really exist and the falseness of these arguments is obvious. Aggression in any form is alien to the fundamental principles of Soviet policy.

Interpreting "containment" and "retaliation" as a countermeasure, the creators of U.S. military doctrine and, incidentally, of NATO doctrine, proceed from the principle of the first use of nuclear weapons. In its military planning and practical deployment of armed forces the United States proceeds from calculations of the initial destruction of opposing Soviet strategic forces in order to avoid an inevitable counterstrike.

The threat of nuclear war emanates only from ultra-reactionary groups in the U.S. ruling class. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Soviet military doctrine is of a defensive nature. The USSR leadership has repeatedly and unambiguously condemned the concept of the acceptability of nuclear war and has rejected the possibility of gaining a victory in such a war.

The doctrine of waging a nuclear war envisages a disruption of the military-strategic balance. Representatives of the "war party" now speak not simply of "containment" but of some kind of "reliable containment," thereby masking their policy of increasing the nuclear danger and justifying their adventurist course. The main point here is that the "balance of fear" in the conditions of parity does not suit apologists of a first nuclear strike. Washington would like to implement unilateral intimidation, basically nuclear blackmail, in order to force the Soviet Union and other states to make concessions.

War, especially nuclear war, is not a continuation of socialist foreign policy; it is hostile to it. The essence of Soviet policy is peaceful coexistence, removing the nuclear threat and preventing a slide toward war. Peaceful coexistence is multifaceted. It is both rivalry and cooperation. It is class struggle and a means of reaching compromises. In the conditions of the nuclear reality of our age, peaceful coexistence is the only sensible and realistic form of existence for mankind in a divided world. Nuclear war goes far beyond the bounds of any wars in the past, even those which had the most tragic consequences for whole nations. Nevertheless, even then the wheel of history continued to turn. A nuclear war, on the other hand, will threaten not only the fate of individual countries and peoples, but also the very existence of mankind. Nuclear weapons as a means of mass destruction by virtue of their very nature cannot be turned only against a certain government or the social system of a certain country. They are intended to destroy all life-supporting systems on earth. Reasoning in any other way means straying into deceptive illusions and displaying one's complete ignorance.

Rejecting the fallacious strategy of "deterrence" and all its forms, the Soviet side proceeds from the productiveness of the principle of parity and equal security in the situation of military-strategic balance. This balance is not an aim in itself. It is rather a means of preventing war. It signifies the potential ability to repulse aggression, the very hypothetical possibility of which must compel the other side to renounce its intention to carry out an attack.

The task lies in maintaining this balance while lowering the level of arms, because restoring the balance at an increasingly higher level is ultimately fraught with the outbreak of war.

The process of accumulating arms has its limits, and it is precisely now that they are particularly discernible. The accumulation of weapons above a certain limit ceases to have obvious military significance, since life on the European continent, and on earth as a whole, can be wiped out only once, and not two or three times over. Overcoming the threat of war can only be achieved by political means--by limiting and reducing arms, making the transition to disarmament and building trust and developing cooperation.

Under present conditions, the level of the Soviet Armed Forces demonstrates to adventurist elements in the United States and within the NATO bloc that there is no future in resolving the historical dispute between the two social systems by military means, just as it is also impossible to count on acquiring any advantage by these means at the expense of the other side. But the United States is trying to pursue a policy of bringing pressure to bear on the Soviet Union by means of "deterrence." This includes the aspiration to "predominance at all levels of nuclear conflict" and connects military superiority with political and global domination.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, adheres to containment in the true sense of the word with regard to the United States, so as to prevent aggression and deprive American militarist circles of the opportunity of resorting to military means of influence upon the socialist community. Soviet policy is aimed at the prevention of war. Consequently, the military capabilities of the Soviet Union acquire vital importance as a means of restricting any actions by aggressive forces in the United States and the NATO bloc.

The Western militarist circles claim that the establishment of nuclear parity has widened the possibility for the Soviet Union to use force in its foreign policy because it has allegedly weakened the American "deterrence" potential. However, the real meaning of parity is not an increase of the Soviet military possibilities (the unchangeable measure of these possibilities has always been the ability to effectively protect the security of the USSR and its allies, neither less nor more) but a reduction of the military possibilities of imperialism. By turning the American "deterrence" into a nuclear stalemate, the Soviet defense might creates a qualitatively new situation which depreciates the gigantic investments of imperialism for armed force and narrows the possibilities for using this force.

At the same time, the American leaders are striving in every possible way to impose restrictions upon Soviet defense efforts, claiming for themselves the right to determine the USSR's legitimate defense requirements and appraise the compliance or noncompliance of various Soviet programs with these hypothetical requirements. Against the background of the United States' present rush toward world domination, Washington's policy looks like nothing more than an attempt to undermine the principle of parity and equal security and nothing more than a demonstration of Washington's imperial arrogance.

The Soviet side has more than enough reason for its well-grounded mistrust of the past and present policies of the White House.

Continuing to declare its adherence to **"/mutual/** [word between slantlines printed in boldface] assured destruction," U.S. ruling circles are in fact

carried away by the arms race: This applies to the MX program, the Trident-2 program, the perfecting of forward-based systems, the development of intermediate-range nuclear weapons with first-strike capability, etc. This policy of the American ultras certainly alarms those who have been publicly marked for destruction in a nuclear conflict.

K. U. Chernenko, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, has said: "The dangerous test of strength which the most reactionary imperialist circles, especially the United States, are imposing on us is not our choice or our policy, but we will know how to stand up for ourselves."¹⁵

We are offering the West honorable conditions for peaceful coexistence. Socialism does not need war. It will be able to demonstrate its advantages through peaceful competition.

As is evidenced by the Political Declaration adopted by the Warsaw Pact countries in Prague in January 1983 and the Declaration of the CEMA Countries on the Preservation of Peace and International Economic Cooperation, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries offer a convincing alternative to the policy of "deterrence." This alternative is the creation of a structure of international relations based on the principles of collective security and peaceful coexistence and making the eventual dissolution of military alliances possible.

In the present political atmosphere poisoned by the aggressive and hegemonist policy of the Reagan Administration, it is particularly important to restore mutual confidence. The constructive efforts of all states in the political sphere are needed for this purpose. To liquidate the stalemate arising from American policy it is of primary importance to end the arms race, move toward arms reduction and maintain the military-strategic balance at an ever lower level. The nuclear arms race can be stopped by strictly respecting the principle of parity and equal security. Then states will be able to move forward toward real nuclear disarmament. Of course, this process requires political will and can be productive only within the framework of an honest, equal and constructive dialogue that takes the interests of all countries into account.

Under present conditions, peace in security in Europe demand the cessation of the accumulation of new nuclear weapons on the continent. The proposals of the socialist states to reach agreements without delay on a complete and general nuclear test ban, a ban on the militarization of outer space and the use of force in outer space and from space against targets on the earth and the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons on the global scale are also quite pertinent. The proposals regarding the conclusion of an agreement on mutual nonaggression and on the maintenance of peaceful relations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries also assume extraordinary importance. The Warsaw Pact countries are also determined to ensure that the nuclear powers renounce--if they have not already done so--the first use of nuclear weapons.

These and other proposals by the states of the socialist community on the issues of detente and disarmament truly represent guidelines for those who are seeking a way out of the blind alley of cold war and nuclear confrontation.

The adoption of the Soviet proposal to agree on the norms of relations between nuclear powers would play a major role in this connection. It is natural that the logic of nuclear thinking adopted by official Washington and denying all limitations and the logic of determining certain norms of behavior for nuclear powers are not compatible.

Many political observers in the United States admit that the policy of pressure on the Soviet Union by force has not worked out. It is difficult to raise any objections to this. Let us only add one thing: It is as a result of Reagan's policy that the direct threat to the United States' own territory has increased and the American people have come closer to recognizing the enormous danger of nuclear war.

The Reagan Administration's goal was to develop total pressure on the Soviet Union and to thereby solve the problems confronting the United States. Washington attributes the existence of these problems to the very existence of our country and its policy. However, something different happened: After nearly 4 years in the White House, it is not only Reagan's policy toward the USSR but also all of the theoretical structures of the "intellectual-conservative complex" that provided the basis for the hostile policy toward the Soviet Union that have failed. Consequently, this policy cannot win support from the general American public, the American ruling class or the Atlantic allies.

And it could not be otherwise. After all, different variations of the same catastrophe are built into the very conceptual basis and practical realization of the policy of the current Washington administration. There are many people who now understand this.

Taking a realistic look at these matters--and this is the only permissible approach in serious politics--we must say that a way out of the existing situation in the relations between the USSR and United States can and must be found. "However," K. U. Chernenko has pointed out, "what is needed for this purpose are not merely assurances of devotion to peace.... What is needed are measures attesting to a readiness not to present the USSR with a fait accompli...."

"It will be necessary to take tangible practical steps that will clearly demonstrate a desire to make negotiation possible."¹⁶

A real positive change in the position of the United States and its allies would certainly evoke the proper response from the Soviet side.

FOOTNOTES

1. THE DEFENSE MONITOR, 1983, vol XII, No 8.
2. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1981, p 31.
3. PRAVDA, 14 February 1984.

4. S. Hoffman, "Dead Ends: American Foreign Policy in the New Cold War," Cambridge (Mass.), 1983, p 121.
5. Ibid.
6. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 1, p 181.
7. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Selected Letters," Moscow, 1948, p 444.
8. Ibid., p 424.
9. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 17, p 187.
10. "Background Information on the Use of U.S. Armed Forces in Foreign Countries," Wash., 1975, p 18.
11. Ibid., pp 58-66.
12. K. Marx and F. Engels, Op. cit., p 444.
13. "Deterrence" signifies both "containment" and "intimidation." The so-called policy of "deterring" the USSR, the policy the United States has pursued throughout the postwar period and is pursuing now, is essentially a policy of "intimidation." It is not surprising that the idea of using nuclear weapons first is the focal point of this policy.
14. The notorious directive NSC-68 of 14 April 1950 said that the main U.S. problem in relations with the Soviet Union was still the need for America to acquire "superior strength." It went on to say: "Without superior aggregate military strength the policy of 'containment,' which is essentially an instrument of weakened and apportioned coercion, will be nothing more than a bluff" ("Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950," N.Y., 1978, pp 401-402).
15. PRAVDA, 15 June 1984.
16. Ibid., 22 June 1984.

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ROOTS OF WASHINGTON'S NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 84 (signed to press 20 Sep 84) pp 26-39

[Article by V. M. Berezhev]

[Text] Some myths have been reinforced repeatedly by overseas propaganda during the 40 years since the war. Perhaps the most tenacious of them is the lie, directly related to U.S. nuclear diplomacy, that as soon as the war had ended Washington, with its monopoly on the atomic bomb, supposedly proposed the establishment of international control over nuclear power and offered to share its knowledge in this field with other nations, to stop the production of atom bombs and to destroy all of the bombs it had on hand. As the story goes, only the Soviet Union's refusal to support this proposal made this ideal unattainable.

When President Reagan was interviewed on Irish television on 31 May 1984, he tried to revive the myth by stating that "our country (that is, the United States--V. B.) proposed back in 1946, when we were the only ones with a nuclear bomb, that an international nuclear arms control commission be set up and that all weapons be put under its control. The Soviet Union had not even developed its own nuclear weapons at that time, but the Russians nevertheless rejected this proposal."

The fact that the master of the White House is giving historical facts his own interpretation is not news. But the myth about the "U.S. willingness" to share the secret of splitting the atom with other countries and to establish international control over nuclear energy in 1946 can often be heard even in well-informed academic circles. Many American specialists treat the story as obvious fact, although nothing could actually be further from the truth.

Many American officials of that time took part in drafting these proposals. But since their most zealous propagandist was financier Bernard Baruch, the proposals are generally called the "Baruch Plan." In the decades since that time, many incorrect ideas and deliberate distortions have arisen in connection with this "plan." It is therefore worthwhile to recall the actual state of affairs. First of all, however, we should take a brief look at the chronology of the development of the American atomic bomb and examine the political alliances formed in U.S. ruling circles in connection with this weapon of mass destruction.

Brief History

The atom bomb began to have an increasing impact on U.S. policy as early as the beginning of 1941. One reason was Einstein's famous letter to President Roosevelt, in which the famous scientist warned that Hitler's Germany might be the first to develop the atomic bomb if the Western democracies did not start work on this in earnest.

The work on the atomic bomb was initially undertaken jointly with the English but it gradually became a purely American project. England consistently avoided participation in the Manhattan Project (the code name of the organization responsible for the development of the atomic bomb--V. B.). Signs of success made American and British politicians wonder about the weapon's effect on the international situation and about the role of the countries knowing the secrets of its production. In essence, they had to decide whether the secret should be kept from the third main member of the anti-Hitler coalition, the Soviet Union, or whether this discovery should be shared with Moscow.

The choice was gradually made as Washington grew increasingly confident of its ability to tame the atom. In the first place, as early as October 1941, when a group on political priorities was formed in the United States to take charge of nuclear power development and production, the American leadership was certain that the bomb should be used in the war if it could be developed in time. In the second place, with a view to the fact that the atomic monopoly would give the United States unprecedented military superiority after the war, Washington politicians planned ways of converting this superiority into an instrument of diplomatic confrontation. The idea of using the new weapon to exert pressure on the Soviet Union and other countries eventually prevailed.

The work on the bomb was conducted in an atmosphere of extreme secrecy. In August 1942 all of the atomic laboratories in the United States were combined under a single roof. It was at that time that the new organization was given the code name of the "Manhattan Project" for security reasons. Secretary of War Henry Stimson was given the responsibility of overseeing its activity. Brigadier General Leslie Groves headed the project.

During the war, when Nazi agents were conducting active espionage and subversive activity in the United States and when there was the danger that Hitler's Germany might be the first to have an atomic bomb, the strict security was understandable. It is interesting, however, that exceptional efforts were made from the very beginning to keep everything secret from the USSR. General Groves never concealed the fact that he regarded the Soviet Union as an enemy and believed that it was most important to keep the new weapon project secret from this enemy.¹

On the orders of General Groves, security agents made certain that none of the European emigre scientists working in this field had "communist connections." They were allowed to work on the Manhattan Project only after this security check. One physicist had to resign after FBI agents discovered that he had visited a reception organized by the Soviet consulate in San Francisco in honor of famous Russian emigre violinist Isaac Stern. Even the director of the laboratory in Los Alamos, Robert Oppenheimer, was under suspicion by army

counterintelligence and was allowed to keep his job only after Groves himself interceded, stating that Oppenheimer was "absolutely essential to the project."²

In summer 1943 President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister W. Churchill signed the Quebec agreement on cooperation in the wartime use of atomic energy. Roosevelt did not object to the British prime minister's intention to use the bomb as a trump card in dealings with the Soviet Union. In this agreement, however, England was assigned the role of a junior partner. It said that in view of the heavy production burden the United States had assumed, the British Government acknowledged that "any matters pertaining to postwar advantages of an industrial and commercial nature should be decided by the United States and England on the terms set forth by the President of the United States to the prime minister of Great Britain. The prime minister hereby declines any interest with regard to these industrial and commercial aspects, with the exception of those the U.S. President might deem suitable, justifiable and necessary for the economic welfare of the world."³

In this way, Washington reserved the right to make unilateral decisions on all possible advantages of atomic energy development. And people in London were satisfied because they believed that the atomic bomb would become "the deciding factor in the postwar world, giving absolute control to the country possessing this secret."⁴ The fact that the two sides pledged in the Quebec document not to divulge any information about the bomb to a third party "without mutual consent" indicates that the primary aim was to keep the atomic secrets from the Soviet Union and use the atomic bomb in their own interests after the war.

Niels Bohr's Initiative

The people who had access to the secret of the atomic bomb and had a sense of history certainly realized that this would unavoidably arouse suspicions in Moscow and complicate postwar reconstruction. This was pointed out by many of the Manhattan Project scientists. They proposed an alternative: By sharing the secret of the bomb with the Soviet Union, the United States and England could secure the necessary conditions for a coordinated policy on the use of atomic energy and the control of atomic weapons. This would have prevented the nuclear arms race. But people in Washington and London chose instead to--in the words of Vannevar Bush, an American scientist involved in the project--"control peace throughout the world" with the aid of the atomic bomb.⁵ Trapped by the illusion that they would be able to keep their atomic monopoly for a long time, American and British politicians began the dangerous series of steps which have turned the world into a nuclear powder keg. The problems mankind is facing today are rooted in the U.S.-English "atomic conspiracy" of World War II.

The first serious attempt to analyze the effects of the atomic bomb on postwar relations between the Western powers and the Soviet Union was made by physicist Niels Bohr, who had escaped to England from Nazi-occupied Denmark in 1943 and had then moved on to the United States, where he worked as a consultant for the Manhattan Project.

Bohr insisted that atomic energy should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and should not be allowed to pose a threat to human civilization. He believed that an agreement to regulate and control atomic energy production should be concluded with the Soviet Union as soon as possible. As the Nobel Prize winner in 1922, the founder and director of the Danish Institute of Theoretical Physics--an institution renowned in the academic world--and an active member of the pre-war international movement for the social responsibility of physicists, Niels Bohr enjoyed considerable prestige among the scientists working on the Manhattan Project. Many of them shared his views.

In spring and summer 1944 Bohr repeatedly advised Churchill and Roosevelt to work out a policy excluding the possibility of a nuclear arms race in the future. He suggested that Moscow be informed of the Manhattan Project to assure it that the project was not aimed against the Soviet Union.⁶

Soon after his move to the United States, Bohr renewed his acquaintance with American scientist Felix Frankfurter, whom he had met back in 1933 at Oxford University in England. In 1939 Frankfurter was appointed chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court by President Roosevelt and was considered to be one of the President's unofficial advisers. Bohr explained his views to Frankfurter, and the latter agreed to speak with the President. According to Frankfurter, the President was interested in these opinions and suggested that Bohr "inform our friends in London that the President is quite interested in investigating the proper course of action" with regard to the atomic bomb.⁷

The Washington administration did not, however, take any further steps. On the contrary, the facts prove that Roosevelt was inclined to agree with Churchill that the atomic bomb should be used after the war to obtain "concessions" from the Soviet Union. This is corroborated, in particular, by the Declaration of Trust signed by Roosevelt and Churchill on 13 June 1944, which announced the intention of both governments to "control as fully as possible the supply of uranium and thorium ore within regions under their jurisdiction and in other regions outside the jurisdiction of the two governments."⁸

President Roosevelt kept a close watch on General Groves' efforts to secure "maximum control over world uranium resources."⁹ The United States tried to seize all deposits of fissionable materials as quickly as possible and thereby retain its position of superiority in relation to other countries. What happened later in the uranium-rich Congo was directly related to the decisions Washington and London made in 1943 and 1944.

When Bohr went to London in April 1944, he received a letter from Soviet physicist P. L. Kapitsa, whom he had known since the latter worked in England before the war. Kapitsa asked Bohr to come to the Soviet Union. Bohr immediately informed the English authorities. With the aid of British security agents, he composed a refusal. Bohr concluded from his receipt of this letter that people in the Soviet Union suspected the real purpose of the Manhattan Project.¹⁰ This motivated him to insist on a meeting with Churchill. He still hoped to convince the prime minister that Moscow should be informed of the work on the bomb as soon as possible and that the postwar control of atomic energy should be negotiated with the Soviet Government.

Churchill delayed the meeting and did not receive Bohr until the middle of May, when he allotted his caller only 30 minutes. The prime minister did not really listen to Bohr, and when Bohr saw that he was running out of time he asked if he might express his views in written form. "It is always a pleasure to receive a letter from Niels Bohr," Churchill replied, not without sarcasm, "but I hope that it will be about something other than politics." When Bohr spoke of this unproductive meeting later, he noted: "We were speaking different languages."¹¹

In June 1944 Bohr returned to the United States in a pessimistic frame of mind. Nevertheless, he hoped that Roosevelt would pay more attention to his ideas. But his second talk with the President did not lead to anything either.¹² When Roosevelt and Churchill met on the Roosevelt estate in Hyde Park in the middle of September, the President officially agreed with Churchill's opinion that Bohr "should not be trusted" and that steps should be taken to prevent "information leaks" through Bohr, "especially to the Russians."¹³

Unsuccessful Blackmail

The decision to keep the work on the atomic bomb a secret from the Soviet Union and the plans to use this weapon to exert pressure on Moscow were prominent among the causes of the cold war. Proceeding from Bohr's assumption that people in the Soviet Union suspected that the United States was secretly building a weapon of unprecedented destructive power, it is easy to understand the kind of feelings this aroused in Moscow. The Soviet leaders who listened to Western politicians talk about their belief in the ideals of "postwar cooperation with the USSR" could not fail to wonder why the leaders of the United States and England, if they were indeed sincere, were keeping the Manhattan Project a secret from their ally and why they were striving to retain a monopoly on the atomic bomb.

Under these conditions, the Soviet side naturally had to take steps to safeguard its own security and not put any trust in the sweet promises of Western diplomats.

Roosevelt's ideas about the use of the atomic bomb were first recorded in a document he and Churchill signed in Hyde Park on 19 September 1944. "When the bomb is ready," the document said, "it might, after sober consideration, be used against the Japanese, who should be warned that the bombing will continue until they surrender."¹⁴ Therefore, when President Truman made the decision to drop the bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he already had precise guidelines to follow.

Later the negative implications of keeping the atomic bomb secret from the Soviet Union were repeatedly brought up by Vannevar Bush and some of Roosevelt's other advisers. An incident which took place not long before the Yalta conference motivated U.S. and English leaders to take another look at the problem. A French physicist who had been working with English specialists in Canada on atomic weapon research visited Free France in spite of the objections of General Groves, who suggested that the scientist be kept under guard

to prevent this trip. When the American authorities learned that this scientist had met with Joliot-Curie in Paris, Washington officials were worried that France might demand access to the Manhattan Project and that the French might inform Moscow of the project if their request should be denied.¹⁶

When President Roosevelt had arrived in Livadia, he suggested to Churchill that this meeting of the "big three" might be used as an opportunity to inform Stalin of the Manhattan Project. Churchill objected vehemently, saying that he was "shocked" by the suggestion. Roosevelt did not insist.¹⁷ In this way, he lost an opportunity to take a step, even during this late stage in the development of the atomic bomb, to secure a more favorable atmosphere for postwar cooperation with the Soviet Union, particularly in the sphere of atomic energy control.

Roosevelt kept his vice-president, H. Truman, in a state of complete ignorance about the Manhattan Project. For this reason, on the day Roosevelt died, after Truman had been sworn in and had presided over the first meeting of his cabinet, Secretary of War Stimson took him aside and told him: "We are working on a new explosive device of incredible destructive force."¹⁸

The next time Stimson went to see the President, on 25 April, he already knew of Truman's confrontation with V. M. Molotov in the White House 2 days earlier, when the new President accused the USSR people's commissar of foreign affairs of violating the Yalta agreements. This convinced Stimson even more of the need to assure the President that the policy of overt confrontation was futile and that more tact should be used in urging the Soviet Union to accept the American plan for atomic energy control, on the strength of which, in Stimson's words, "peace and earth and our civilization can be saved."¹⁹

Obviously, the "peace" Stimson referred to was supposed to fit the American pattern. Stimson believed that Moscow would agree to the U.S. terms of this peace in exchange for the right to participate in atomic energy control.

Truman listened to Stimson and later wrote in his diary that the secretary of war "is at least as concerned about the atom bomb's ability to make history as its ability to shorten the war."²⁰ A practical result of the meeting was the President's approval of Stimson's suggestion that a special commission be created to investigate the postwar implications of atomic energy use. Even then, however, Truman was already weighing the possibilities of atomic blackmail of the Soviet Union. When he had to schedule another meeting of the "big three," he decided to time it to coincide with the first atomic bomb test.²¹

The telegram Truman received in Potsdam about the success of the experimental blast in New Mexico at the Alamogordo Air Force Base inspired the American leaders with hope. After one of the plenary sessions of the Potsdam conference, Truman informed I. V. Stalin that the United States had produced a new weapon of "exceptional destructive force" in the certainty that no one would dare go against his wishes now. Stalin immediately realized his intentions and was completely unperturbed by the news. The Soviet delegation continued to defend the interests of the USSR as steadfastly as before. As a result, Truman was not able to implement the atomic blackmail in Potsdam.

The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not produce the results desired by Washington either, but it did heighten its desire for atomic hegemony. The "Baruch Plan" was the logical result of all this. Its compilers assumed that it would take the Soviet Union many years, if not decades, to develop an atomic bomb. General Groves, for example, asserted in October 1947, just 2 years before the USSR had its own atomic bomb, that "it will be 15 or 20 years before the Russians have the bomb."²² During this period, Washington hoped to move far ahead in atomic weapon production and accumulate sizeable weapon stocks, guaranteeing it the dominant position in the world.

The Real Purpose of the "Baruch Plan"

When President Truman decided to appoint 70-year-old banker Bernard Baruch the chief American representative to the UN Committee on Atomic Energy, many people were puzzled. This was the reaction, in particular, of David Lilienthal, who had drafted the American proposals on atomic energy with Dean Acheson. "When I heard the news yesterday evening," he said, "I felt sick.... We need a man who is young, energetic, not vain and not likely to give the Russians the impression that he wants to push them into a corner and that he essentially does not care about international cooperation. Baruch has none of these qualities."²³

But Lilienthal was obviously underestimating some of the other qualities of Truman's appointee. Baruch was just the man to attain American diplomatic objectives. He had colossal experience in self-advertisement, which allowed him to exaggerate his philanthropic undertakings beyond all reason and become popular in the United States. Now this financier who had amassed a huge fortune with his smart stock market speculations was supposed to sell the American public and the world community the idea of U.S. domination of the planet under the cover of the "philanthropic" and "unselfish" plan for "international" (but actually American--V. B.) control over atomic energy. And despite Baruch's advanced age, he did this job with youthful exuberance.

The plan the Americans proposed was quite sweeping and detailed. It covered such aspects as the interrelations of the international atomic energy control agency with the UN Security Council (it specified that the Security Council with its principle of the unanimity of the great powers should not become involved in matters pertaining to the use of atomic energy); the functions and privileges of the international control agency (according to the Americans, it was supposed to accumulate all of the information about world sources and known deposits of atomic raw materials and have the right of unlimited access to the territories of specific countries); the ownership, control and management of the atomic industry (the control agency was supposed to exercise management and ownership rights to all large atomic energy enterprises); research (the research and experimental work of individual countries were to be limited if the international agency should find them "dangerous").

In addition, the international agency was supposed to have the exclusive right to conduct research and experimental work in the sphere of nuclear weapons, using its own personnel and own equipment, which essentially nullified the entire idea of prohibiting nuclear weapons. Furthermore, states were supposed to report to the international control agency on land and air observations of

regions with known or suspected deposits of uranium and thorium ore; the military occupation of certain countries for the "protection" of atomic enterprises and regions of atomic raw material extraction was envisaged. Formally, the occupation was supposed to be conducted by the armed forces of the international control agency, but actually it would be the U.S. Army, because the removal of the Security Council and the principle of the unanimity of its permanent members from these matters would allow Washington to take any course of action it wished by simply making use of its automatic majority in the UN General Assembly.

The "Baruch Plan" also envisaged the right of the international agency to decide the "strategic location" of the atomic industry. This initially seemed to mean that all types of activity inherently posing a "threat to security" should not be concentrated in one location, but it actually meant something quite different. It raised the issue of the so-called "threat of aggression," implying that an individual country's attempt to establish its own atomic industry with all of the appropriate enterprises would be regarded as an "act of aggression." This pertained to countries making this attempt after the adoption of the American plan and refraining from turning over all of their atomic raw materials to the control agency. These countries would thereby commit an act of "aggression," which would be interpreted as "preparations for nuclear war." This "disobedience" could warrant the use of the atomic bomb against these countries. At the same time, any state which already had an atomic industry and atomic raw material reserves by that time (and only the United States fit this description--V. B.) would not be considered to have committed an act of "aggression" and could continue producing atomic bombs on a "legal basis," at least until the time in the distant future when the stage of the "destruction" of all atomic weapon stockpiles was to take place in accordance with the "Baruch Plan."

In connection with this, the "stages of control" over atomic energy played a special role. This section of the American proposals essentially said that control would be established by stages, and not all at once. This, the document said, "will secure the possibility of its consistent accomplishment, beginning with the transfer of control over raw material extraction to the agency, followed by the control of industrial production and, finally, control of explosive materials."²⁴

The Lilienthal-Acheson recommendations, which lay at the basis of the "Baruch Plan" and were submitted to the United Nations for consideration in 1946, said quite unequivocally: "The duration of the replacement of the present situation with a state of international atomic balance is stipulated in a specially planned schedule. When the plan has been carried out in its entirety, there will be a certain degree of security against sudden attacks. The plan defines clear signals of danger and allows us enough time to prepare for atomic warfare in this event. It is significant that all atomic enterprises will still be located in the United States throughout the period of transition."²⁵

As for this "period of transition," according to the American plan it could drag on indefinitely. This is apparent just from the American interpretation of the first stage of control, envisaging observations of all countries. The

international agency would have the right to take selective aerial photographs once every 2 years over a region not exceeding 5 percent of the territory of a state or a region with a total area of no more than 2,000 square miles (5,180 square kilometers), whichever was greater. It is easy to calculate that with this procedure it would have taken decades to take aerial photographs of all the territory of an average-sized country.

As a result, the first stage of control, not to mention the second, could have dragged on for almost a whole century. It was impossible to predict when the last stage of control, including the prohibition of atomic weapons, would begin. And for all of this time the United States would retain its monopoly on the production of atomic energy and nuclear weapons. When Baruch submitted this plan, he frankly said: "The United States will turn its government control over this area to the administration (the international agency--V. B.) only after each sequential stage of international control has been completed and only in the volume needed for each stage."²⁷

As we can see, the aims of the authors of the American proposals had nothing to do with the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction or genuine international control of atomic energy. The purpose of the "Baruch Plan" was essentially the following:

To concentrate the atomic industry and atomic raw materials within the United States and in countries close to the pro-American group of nations;

To deprive the Soviet Union and other countries "disapproved" by the United States of the right to use atomic energy in any significant quantity, not only for defensive purposes but also for the needs of their economies;

To prevent the establishment of control over the U.S. military atomic industry and to simultaneously preclude any demands for the prohibition of the production and storage of atomic weapons by the United States;

To establish the international legal prerequisites for the seizure of all existing deposits of atomic raw materials in the world by the United States.

It is understandable that the Soviet Union definitely rejected the American plan.

Henry Wallace's Letter

Many serious researchers in the West admit that the Baruch Plan was supposed to serve U.S. hegemonic goals. English political scientist Evan Luard notes that whatever the motives may have been for the American proposals, "they would essentially have put the Soviet Union in a permanent subordinate position."²⁸

A similar conclusion was drawn by American research Greg Herken in his book "The Winning Weapon." He said that "the 'Baruch Plan' was essentially a U.S. ultimatum to Russia: Either give up nuclear weapons or be destroyed."²⁹

The monopolist press heaped praise on the Baruch Plan as an "altruistic," "noble" and "unselfish" American proposal. But many politicians who knew the real purpose of the plan were already privately expressing their worries about its possible consequences. For example, Ferdinand Eberstadt, a member of the U.S. delegation, expressed his worry that the American public would someday accuse the authors of the Baruch Plan of putting forth proposals "obviously unacceptable to the Soviets, which they will reject" and of the intention to "form an atomic alliance against them."³⁰

Few Americans wanted, however, to openly oppose the proposals. The only prominent official who dared to do this was Henry Wallace, Roosevelt's former vice-president who had retained the office of secretary of commerce at the beginning of Truman's presidency. Wallace was disturbed by Washington's projected preparations for war with the Soviet Union and sent Truman a letter at the end of July 1946, asking him to "understand" the Soviet position. "How would we feel," Wallace pointed out, "if Russia had the atom bomb and we did not, if Russia had bombers with a flight range of 10,000 miles and bases located just a thousand miles from our coastline and we did not?" Wallace directed special attention to the "fatal flaw" in the Baruch Plan--the demand that "Russia stop all atomic research and disclose its uranium and thorium resources while the United States retains the right to keep all technical knowledge about atomic energy a secret until international control and the inspection system are functioning to our satisfaction. In other words, we are telling the Russians that if they are 'good little boys' we might share our knowledge about atomic energy with them and other countries.... Is it any wonder that the Russians were not more enthusiastic about our plan?"

In an attempt to give Truman, an avid poker player, a simple explanation of this situation, Wallace resorted to the following analogy: "The Soviet Union has only two cards it can use in negotiations with us: 1) our lack of information about the status of its scientific and technical progress in the sphere of atomic energy, 2) our lack of knowledge about its uranium and thorium resources. These cards are certainly not as strong as ours--bomb depots, existing enterprises for the manufacture of these bombs, B-29 and B-36 bombers and our network of bases covering half the world. Nevertheless, we are actually demanding that it (the USSR--V. B.) immediately show us its only two cards, telling it that we will decide whether we want to continue the game after we have seen them."³¹ This appeal, which was a voice in the wilderness, had only one consequence: Henry Wallace had to retire soon afterward.

Documents recently made available to researchers contain many indications of why the White House ignored Wallace's comments. For example, in one letter President Truman instructed Baruch: "We must stand firm on our plan. We must certain that the raw material needed for the release of atomic energy is controlled at the source, and I believe that under no circumstances should we throw down our gun (the atomic bomb--V. B.) until we are certain that the rest of the world will be unable to arm itself against us.... I think we understand one another in this matter."³²

After the first postwar experimental blast, Baruch, who had won the total support of the President, resolutely rejected the Soviet-French proposal that the United States stop the production of atomic bombs as a "gesture of goodwill" until agreements had been reached to discourage their use.

The Atomic Bluff

Fred Searls, a member of the American UN delegation headed by Baruch, informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff in May 1946 about the administration's position on atomic energy control talks and explained that in accordance with the Baruch Plan, the states party to the international agency "will sign a treaty outlawing the use of the atomic bomb and will agree that if any country violates the treaty, regardless of whether it has signed it or not, other signatories will automatically and immediately use the atomic bomb against the violator." On this basis, Searls proposed the establishment of five key bases with four or six atomic bombs each--on the Azores and in Cairo, Karachi, Burma and the Philippines. The commanders of these bases would have sealed envelopes containing orders to deliver strikes of "retribution" against the violating country.³³ The generals and admirals to whom Searls explained all of these details immediately understood what he was driving at. In their commentary on his report, they said what Searls had omitted, namely that the location of the bases was "obviously directed against the USSR."³⁴

An interesting part of this entire story was that no one then knew exactly how many atomic bombs the United States had. Wallace wrote about "bomb depots," and when Searls spoke with the Joint Chiefs of Staff he seemed to believe that the Americans had at least 20 to 30 bombs to deploy on the 5 bases he mentioned. In any case, both the opponents and the propagandists of the Baruch Plan believed that Washington had already accumulated a sizeable atomic arsenal. It was precisely on this basis that the American atomic diplomacy of "intimidation" was founded. It later turned out that this was a bold bluff.

Soon after he was appointed chairman of the American Atomic Energy Commission, D. Lilienthal discovered that atomic weapon production was not at all what it seemed to the uninitiated. In a report to Truman he said that "the current production of atomic bombs is going very slowly." He learned that not one bomb existed in assembled form and that the mechanism of the perfected bomb which was being produced at that time was "new and untested."³⁵

The number of atomic bombs the United States had on hand during the period of the American nuclear monopoly was a carefully guarded secret. The importance of this secret is corroborated by the absence of a specific figure in any document. The number was reported only orally even to the President, and he was invariably shocked by how low it was. Recalling Truman's reaction to his report, Lilienthal noted that the expression on the President's face showed clearly that he was shocked by the negligible quantity of bombs the United States had. Later Lilienthal admitted that he was also unpleasantly shocked by this. "We actually had only one bomb (after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki--V. B.) in a state of readiness,"³⁶ he stated.

In an article in the February 1947 issue of HARPER'S, former Secretary of War Stimson reported that there were only two bombs in the American arsenal and that the production of new bombs was going very slowly.³⁷ Furthermore, the United States still did not have the means of delivering the bomb to targets in the USSR.

This debunks another myth of Washington's nuclear diplomacy--the fact that the United States did not take advantage of its atomic monopoly to bomb the Soviet Union supposedly testifies to America's love of peace and proves that U.S. military superiority never posed a threat to anyone but, rather, guaranteed a strong peace. In reality, this was certainly not the case. Although the United States was then the only country with a bomb, it did not have the necessary quantity of nuclear weapons or means of delivering them to give it definite superiority and guarantee a victory over the USSR.

The accumulation of U.S. nuclear weapons over the past four decades is directly related to Washington's constant pursuit of the chimera of "definite superiority" to the Soviet Union. This is also the reason for Reagan's "star wars" plan. Past experience, however, has repeatedly proved the futility of these plans. By 1949, when U.S. bomb stocks began to grow, the Soviet Union also had an atomic weapon. And this is still the situation: Whatever complex weapon systems the Americans invent, they are unable to keep their monopoly for long.

The appearance of the Soviet Union's atomic weapon radically changed the entire situation in the world and demonstrated the illusory nature of Washington's plans. But this did not lead to the revision of U.S. policy in the direction of American acknowledgement of the need for mutually acceptable agreements with the USSR. On the contrary, Washington responded by developing an even more destructive weapon, the hydrogen bomb. Although the Soviet hydrogen bomb appeared almost at the same time, Washington's policy did not change. The Soviet side repeatedly proposed the destruction of all weapons based on the release of nuclear energy, but the American apologists for the bomb never lost their dream of "superior strength" and "victory" in a war with the USSR. They believed that "superior odds" could lead to a victory with "acceptable" losses ("Drophot," the 1957 plan for an American war with the USSR envisaged a 10-fold American nuclear superiority).³⁸ Back in 1945 the same General Groves was extremely "optimistic" about the outcome of a "nuclear duel" with the Soviet Union when he testified in congressional hearings. He assured the legislators that this war "could cause the death of 40 million Americans" (!), but that this would not keep the United States from "eventually winning the war."³⁹

Today's Washington leaders also regard the death of 20-40 million Americans in a nuclear war as an "acceptable" loss for the United States.

The Alternative

Was there an alternative to the nuclear arms race? Yes, there was. It was proposed in the Soviet plan for the regulation of the atomic problem, envisaging the effective implementation of decisions to destroy all atomic weapons and prohibit the use of nuclear power for military purposes. On 19 June 1946 a Soviet delegation submitted the following proposals to the UN Atomic Energy Commission:

- 1) A proposal on the conclusion of an international convention to prohibit the production and use of weapons utilizing atomic energy for the purpose of mass destruction.

2) A proposal on the operational organization of an atomic energy control commission.

The Soviet delegation also submitted a draft convention. Its first article said that the signatories were announcing their decision to prohibit the production and use of atomic weapons and were therefore pledging:

- a) not to use atomic weapons under any circumstances;
- b) to prohibit the production and storage of weapons based on the use of atomic energy;
- c) to destroy all stockpiles of finished and unfinished atomic weapons within 3 months after the convention goes into effect.⁴⁰

The Soviet Union proposed a precise program. The American maneuvers to avoid the prohibition of atomic weapons were countered by the unambiguous policy of a categorical and immediate ban on the use of atomic energy for military purposes. Washington's desire to continue supplementing its atomic arsenal was countered by the proposal that all existing atomic bombs be destroyed as quickly as possible.

The second article of the Soviet draft convention said: "The signatories hereby announce that the violation of the first article of the convention will be the gravest international crime, a crime against mankind." The third article demanded the adoption of legislative acts against violators of the convention by a specific date.⁴¹

The Soviet draft went on to say that the convention would be open-ended and that it could be signed by any state, by UN members and non-members. The convention would go into effect after its ratification by the Security Council and by the UN secretary-general and after the ratification documents of half of its signatories, including all of the UN members, had been turned over to the UN secretary-general. After this, the convention would be binding for all states, both UN members and non-members.⁴²

The Soviet proposals indicated a way of successfully solving the atomic problem in the interest of all mankind. If they had been adopted, the world would have escaped the destructive nuclear arms race and would not now be facing the horrifying danger of nuclear war, which could annihilate all life on our planet. But the U.S. Government rejected the Soviet draft convention because it was chasing the specter of nuclear superiority and victory over the USSR. In this way, it assumed the grave responsibility for all of the consequences of this refusal.

The compilers of the Baruch Plan were trapped by the same impossible fantasy now cherished by the Reagan Administration, which intends to disrupt the military-strategic balance between the United States and USSR and create conditions allowing the United States to "prevail" in a nuclear war with the Soviet Union.

What a hold these impossible dreams have on the U.S. ruling elite! For almost 40 years successive administrations in Washington have tried to achieve

military superiority to the Soviet Union, threatening the use of nuclear weapons to force the Soviet people to bow to the United States. All of these attempts have failed and all future attempts are bound to fail. It is time for American policymakers to realize that relations between our two countries, just as relations between any states, can only be based on equality and equivalent security, on mutual benefit and totally equitable terms. This will secure a peaceful future for mankind. The Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community have expressed their willingness to conclude mutually acceptable agreements based on these principles.

The declaration of the CEMA countries, signed in Moscow on 14 June 1984 at a CEMA summit meeting, says: "There is no objective more important today than the preservation of peace on earth and the prevention of nuclear catastrophe. It is of primary importance to curb the arms race and make the transition to arms reduction and the maintenance of a military-strategic balance at ever lower levels.... Conference participants are certain that the nuclear arms race can be stopped and states can begin taking real steps toward nuclear disarmament with the strict observance of the principle of equality and equivalent security. This will require political determination and an honest, equitable and constructive dialogue with consideration for the security interests of all countries."⁴³

An opportunity to destroy atomic death in its infancy was lost 40 years ago because of Washington's ambitions. As a result of the unprecedented stockpiling of nuclear weapons, an unprecedented threat is hanging over mankind. But it is still not too late. The world can still be stopped from sliding into a nuclear catastrophe. Washington must give up all of its old myths for this purpose.

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'NEONATIONALISM' IN CONTEMPORARY U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS)

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 84 (signed to press 20 Sep 84) pp 40-50

[Article by Ye. V. Yegorova]

[Text] A qualitatively new stage of American nationalism, which has been termed the "new nationalism" or "neonationalism" in American scientific and political literature, became quite apparent in the foreign policy thinking and behavior of U.S. administrations in the international arena in the second half of the 1970's and the early 1980's. Famous American political scientist R. Tucker argues that the "new nationalism was a reaction to the apparent decline of American power."¹

But this is an extremely oversimplified and, quite possibly, deliberately distorted view of "neonationalism," ignoring its main features. "Neonationalism" reflects common deep-seated and long-term trends in the development of nationalism in the broad U.S. social spectrum and the nationalist nature of the sociopolitical system in general. Communist Party Secretary-General Gus Hall has said that "the ideological essence of American imperialism was always the racist chauvinism of a great power."²

The "neonationalism" present in Washington's current foreign policy is simultaneously the traditional nationalist line of behavior in the world arena, which has been developing over many decades of American history, and a philosophy engendered by the specific domestic and international conditions of the 1970's and 1980's, a phenomenon with its distinctive historical, sociopolitical, ideological and psychological features. The main difference between this philosophy and the traditional nationalism in American society and its foreign policy manifestations consists in the fact that it was engendered by the purposeful efforts of certain class forces in the historical context resulting from, on the one hand, the U.S. defeat in Vietnam and, on the other, the established line of detente, and was cultivated by means of the artificial stimulation of feelings of national humiliation in the American public. This activity was supposed to convert the mood of the "post-Vietnam syndrome" into passionate chauvinistic and militaristic fervor. According to the people who were stirring up "neonationalism" in the United States, this was supposed to undermine detente, intensify the arms race and promote heightened confrontation with the socialist world, a struggle for military superiority and the

forceful and aggressive behavior of the administrations of the late 1970's and early 1980's.

Analyzing the effects of nationalism in its present disguise on U.S. foreign policymaking, American authors approach this phenomenon from the standpoint of bourgeois methodology. They see it only as a reflection of the psychological stereotypes which have taken shape during the American nation's development, stereotypical beliefs in the exceptional nature and special international role of the United States and the corresponding view of other nations. As a rule, works by American researchers ignore the actual socioeconomic, class, political and ideological implications of American nationalism's advancement in the sphere of foreign policy.

This kind of onesided and superficial psychologization of the complex deep-seated causes of contemporary nationalism and the ways in which it influences American imperialism's foreign policy presents a crudely distorted picture of this process, depriving it of historical validity. This leads to the recognition and justification of the "neonationalist" trend as something eternal, extra-historical, natural and irrevocable and, what is most important, as the leading factor in Washington's foreign policy activity. It is from this standpoint that American writers examine the nationalist subtext of U.S. foreign policy in specific international situations.

Of course, "neonationalism" should be analyzed primarily as a sociopolitical and ideological phenomenon. Only this approach can provide a fundamentally accurate methodological basis for its examination. Since politico-psychological factors play an important role in U.S. foreign policymaking, the psychological implications of "neonationalism," its purpose and significance and the complicated group of justifications, motives and mechanisms of Washington's foreign policy require more detailed analysis within the historical context of our day.

Psychological Bases of American Nationalism

In the politico-psychological sense (obviously, this is not the only level on which the phenomenon should be examined), "neonationalism" is reflected in U.S. foreign policy simultaneously as a method of viewing the world, a way of thinking and an established system of values. The traditional ethnocentrism, indissolubly connected to the entire history of the American state and its foreign policy, served as the soil for its cultivation.³

The ethnocentric approach is essentially a rigid politico-psychological division of the world into two hostile and irreconcilable camps: "We"--this is primarily my nation, my state and--always in second place and always with stipulations, never unconditionally--its allies; and "they"--my enemies, the rest of the world. This primitive ethnocentric view of the world is accompanied by the individual's strong identification with his nation and the tendency attribute all positive qualities to it. "They," on the other hand, are assigned the most monstrous defects. Suspicion, excessive caution and intolerance for "them" are elevated to the status of the highest virtues and wisdom of any American, particularly those at the top of the bureaucratic ladder.

"In short," American psychologist B. Glad says, "the world is divided into two camps, with all morality on the side of one and all evil on the side of the other, and with two possibilities: winning or losing. There are no compromises between states in this world."⁴

According to famous research S. Hoffman, the U.S. political elite "sees every issue...as a global problem and a problem of 'our' influence or 'their' threat."⁵

Nationalism and its psychological counterpart, ethnocentrism, have been influencing the foreign policy ideology and behavior of U.S. ruling circles for decades, and their development has not been confined to the elite. As a rule, ethnocentrism, reflecting a nationalist view of the world, is quite closely and obviously related to the ideological and political views and the psychological characteristics of the American "middle class."⁶

Unrestrained, extremist chauvinism, the tendency to view other countries and nationalities from the standpoint of the unconditional and eternal superiority of everything American--a model of the best economic, moral and political qualities in the world and a counterbalance to everything else in the world, primarily "world communism" in recent years--has been cultivated in the average American's mind for more than two centuries.

In an article in PUBLIC OPINION, sociologist and public opinion analyst E. Ladd quotes a statement from a famous work by historian and sociologist L. Samson: "We learn that Americanism is not a tradition or a territorial category for Americans, but a doctrine," essentially the "basis of American nationalism."⁷

It is precisely this ethnocentrism that conveys, on the strength of the historical and psychological peculiarities of this mechanism, the influence of the politically dominant group into the very depths of the "middle class," manipulating its opinions, attitudes and reactions and helping to seek (and find) support for government foreign policy in this milieu. In turn, the same ethnocentrism gives foreign policy decision-makers feedback regarding the hopes, wishes and demands of this class, sometimes in the form of an initiative from below. Often this complex interaction engenders support for the administration's tough belligerent line in international affairs. "People with ethnocentric views," B. Glad writes, "share the values of the middle class, are undiscerning in their admiration of the idealized authorities of their groups and punish those who challenge established values."⁸

For many decades the U.S. ruling elite artificially exploited the average American's mental picture of the foreign enemy as "world communism," especially the USSR. This mental picture has been carefully cultivated by the Reagan Administration, using the mass media to convince the average American that "they," the enemy, communists, are preparing to take everything he holds most dear--American "liberty and democracy." The promoters of ethnocentrism appeal less to reason than to the emotional and even the irrational spheres of public opinion, striving to expand and reinforce everything connected with the concept "we" in the mentality and psychology of the "middle class" and to reduce and undermine everything associated with the concept "they." This idea was

clearly expressed by P. Nitze, a chauvinist rightwing politician, who underscored the importance of the "politico-psychological context of the struggle to expand 'us' and reduce 'them.'"⁹

Sometimes the impression that chauvinism and ethnocentrism are merely vestiges of an earlier American outlook is conveyed. But some American specialists, especially P. Berger,¹⁰ have noted a new upsurge in these feelings in the United States in the early 1980's.

There is no question that the specific sociopsychological features of the average American have been clearly reflected in the Reagan Administration's foreign policy activity. Many members of the Republican administration acquired their political education in this milieu and are distinguished by the inherent nationalism of the American "middle class" in all of its primitive and maximalist forms. They, including the President of the United States, have accepted all of its biases and stereotypes. As a direct relative of the ethnocentric mass mentality, the nationalism of administration members is just as primitive and is usually more instinctive and irrational than reasonable and logical.

The primitive nature of the nationalist beliefs and convictions of the U.S. ruling elite, which acts according to traditional stereotypes, stems not only from the genetic code of its social origins but also from the quite deliberate efforts of upper strata to act in accordance with the beliefs and convictions of middle strata, and even to pose as part of these strata for the purpose of their better manipulation and the acquisition of support for their actions within the country and in the international arena.

It would be wrong, however, to confine all of this only to the level of the nationalist views Ronald Reagan and his closest advisers either obtained from the middle strata or are cultivating in their current political activity. After all, many members of the administration are professional politicians and are distinguished by a purely political perception, interpretation and use of nationalism rather than the common view of this phenomenon.

The Nationalism of the New Stage: Sociopolitical, Ideological and Psychological Features

Whereas traditional nationalism with its psychological base which has taken shape over a period of decades (the ethnocentrism of the ruling elite and the mass political mentality) constantly imbues U.S. foreign policy with old stereotypes, convictions and biases, "neonationalism" reflects, although in a distorted way, the current stage of development and is becoming a qualitatively new, quite specific model of the nationalist view of the world. Its foundation is largely the same, but its superstructure is considerably different in its precise connection with contemporary processes in international relations and with their subjective appearance in Washington's domestic and foreign policies. The traditions of "Americanism" play some part here, but it would be impossible to reduce "neonationalism" only to them.

On the sociopolitical and ideological level, the basis of the nationalism of this new stage consists of the neoconservative current in some strata of

American society, primarily the political elite in Washington, intermingled with traditional conservatism and the activities of the "New Right."

It was precisely with the use of nationalist arguments that neoconservatives began their covert preparations for a reversal in U.S. foreign policy. At first they took action outside the bureaucratic framework, relying on the support of many prominent individuals from the business community, the Republic Party right wing, former leftists and former liberals from the Democratic Party, high-level functionaries and military groups and influential representatives of the press and academic centers.

Even at the beginning of their struggle to infiltrate the highest levels of government, the neoconservatives were already demonstrating an inherent and deliberately exaggerated nationalism of a new type. According to English researcher C. Bell, "in U.S. foreign policy debates, the first to be called conservative were rightwing groups whose positions included the overt rejection of detente and the subscription to common doctrines which might be described precisely as a nationalism erasing all distinctions and oversimplifying everything--whether it was expressed in the issue of the Panama Canal or the issue of relations with the Soviet Union."¹¹

In the foreign policy sphere "neonationalism" inundated the American public with false information, sophistic warnings and threats and gloomy predictions. One of the most zealous neoconservatives, N. Podhoretz, tried to frighten Americans and arouse their anger back in 1976 by telling them: "If the ideas of the new isolationism should prevail among the people to the degree that they now prevail among the elite, the United States will celebrate its bicentennial by giving up the legacy of freedom which has aroused the amazement and envy of the entire world from the moment of its acquisition and by helping to make the world safe for the most determined, brutal and barbarous enemies of freedom the world has ever known."¹²

The "Committee on the Present Danger" was created in the mid-1970's by people on the extreme right who were quite influential in foreign policy affairs and had a nationalist mentality. They drew up a program representing an alternative to detente, emphasizing an arms race and admitting the possibility of a nuclear war with the prospect of victory.

When Reagan took office, he gave the neoconservatives from the Committee on the Present Danger prominent positions in his administration. Furthermore, they took key positions precisely in the U.S. foreign policymaking mechanism. But the main thing was that they actually developed the "neonationalist," chauvinistic ideology, mentality and strategic line of reasoning and set the guidelines for the current administration's foreign and military policies throughout Reagan's term in office. This gave the Republican administration its own "image."

The foreign policy views of the rightists who call themselves "neonationalists" effected the ideological and political preparations for "Reaganism." Famous American journalist R. Scheer notes: "The members of this group categorically rejected peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union.... Instead, they were seeking a method of using confrontation, a method of using political and

economic pressure and threats of military action to radically change the nature of Soviet society.... These are views that had been espoused for years by men languishing in the wings of power, waiting for one of their own to move to center stage. With Reagan, their time had come."¹³

The basic, pervasive theme of the militarist program of the "neonationalists" from the extreme right wing is the idea of the permissibility of nuclear war and the possibility of winning this kind of war. Nationalists from the neoconservative camp--E. Rostow, C. Gray, C. Paine, R. Pipes and R. Perle--regularly make reckless statements about the ability of the United States to survive and win a nuclear war.

Therefore, the first and main function of the nationalism of the new stage in U.S. foreign policy in the 1970's and 1980's was its ideological, political and psychological stimulation of the intoxication of the ruling elite and part of the American general public with military strength, aggression and expansionism. President Reagan expressed this view when he made the revealing statement that "the reality is that we must seek peace through strength."¹⁴ Secretary of State G. Shultz tried to conceptualize the "neonationalist" beliefs about Washington's role in world politics with references to national history, telling the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "Each postwar American President has realized sooner or later that peace must be built on strength. President Reagan took a long time to realize this fact. In the past 2 years our government--the President in his partnership with the Congress--assumed the fundamental commitment to restore military and economic power and moral and spiritual strength."¹⁵

The psychological mechanism for the incorporation of "neonationalist" ideas in the political thinking of the American "middle class," the bureaucratic elite and the foreign policy decision-makers in the United States is quite complex. But it has its own logic and it cannot be categorized as an accidental or spontaneous process. On the contrary, this process is monitored, adjusted and controlled from beginning to end. It is invested with the political will and purposeful activity of reactionary forces.

The nationalism of the 1970's and 1980's also differs from the nationalism of previous years because it is not based on the appealing ideas and aims of the U.S. domination of other peoples and states, but on the belief that the United States has lost its dominant position in the world. In words by American researchers this is usually associated with the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, the appearance of the "Vietnam syndrome" in ruling circles, the "losses" in the world arena (including Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Kampuchea and Afghanistan), the trauma of the energy crisis, the severe wounds and humiliation caused by the American hostage incident in Tehran, the sense of disappointment with the disobedience of the West European NATO allies and Japan, complications in relations with China and, above all, the "growing Soviet military strength," which supposedly led to the decline of U.S. influence and its role in world affairs. The nationalism of the new stage is usually depicted within the country, and even outside it, as a completely natural, although quite morbid, reaction on the part of the administration and the population to all of these losses and defeats, including the imaginary ones which have been distorted for the purpose of manipulating public opinion.

Of course, each of the episodes cited as proof of U.S. losses, in spite of all their diversity, played a definite role in American foreign policy--either real, exaggerated or absolutely imaginary--and provided retroactive explanations of various foreign policy actions by the administration. But all of these absolutely diverse incidents can be depicted as an undifferentiated group only within the context of a politically motivated plan for the purposeful manipulation of public opinion.

The last two administrations--Democratic and Republican--used Washington's defeats and failures in the world arena to create and reinforce feelings of futility and hopelessness, called the psychology and ethics of frustration in Marxist-Leninist philosophy.¹⁶ They engendered an inferiority complex in their own interests and used it skillfully to provide an outlet for the nationalist feelings of the offended Americans making up most of the "middle class."

If nationalism's followers had confined their arguments only to laments over the decline of American power, the extreme right wing's goals in the manipulation of public opinion--the goals of undermining detente and restoring U.S. military superiority--might not have been attained. But the "neonationalist" propagandists took the next step, rejecting the feelings of humiliation, depression and passivity, stirring up chauvinism and provoking passionate emotional reactions on the part of the population and the administration to international events.

The nationalism of the 1970's and 1980's--and this is another of its most salient features--is not only growing out of the artificial feelings of regret over the loss of U.S. influence in the world, but also out of the desire, prescribed from above, to regain this influence by any means, including military and nuclear means. The "neonationalists" are deliberately directing the emotions of the general public in favor of the restoration of lost U.S. power. And it is not merely wounded pride or frustration, but primarily the feelings of revenge engendered by this wounded pride, that constitute, in line with the rightwing plans, the motivation of Washington foreign policy. It is in this direction that the people from the "neonationalist" (and neoconservative) camp are pushing this policy.

This is how American politicians and political scientists are building up the analytical structure of "neonationalism"--purposeful, offensive, pushy, unpromising, belligerent and aggressive chauvinism--in the search for the United States' revitalized and compounded absolute military strength and dominant influence in the world.

The connection between frustration and nationalism was established long ago by American researchers themselves--political scientists and political psychologists. They regard nationalism as an important determining factor in their country's reactions to the behavior of other states. The stronger the nationalist feelings, the stronger the hostility the frustration engendered by "threats" from another state will produce. American specialists have directed attention to the chronic hostility that feeds new hostile feelings. Their interaction is extremely dangerous. Even in ordinary situations this can lead to overreaction, they say, referring specifically to the United States.¹⁷

Valparaiso University Professor D. Nuechterlein, a prominent political scientist, tried to discern the future of the Republican Party in an article in the rightwing magazine COMMENTARY and stated, with a reference to K. Phillips' book "Post-Conservative America," that the United States is distinguished by "a nationalist intoxication with its own status (and frustration)."18 In this way, he corroborated the interaction of these two seemingly polar politico-psychological phenomena. The specific relationship between "neonationalism" and frustration is pointed out in a work by W. Scott Thompson, the ideologist of the extreme right wing of militarists and hegemonists.19

In this way, the politico-psychological establishment of "neonationalism" in the United States is being promoted by an often artificial inferiority complex, cultivated or maintained from above, in the international arena and the creation of a need for compensation, also provoked from above in many cases, and direct revenge. It is also being promoted by the creation, again from above, of a superiority complex with the aim of carrying out the revanchist program. Members of the administration and representatives of various strata of the American society who share the "neonationalist" viewpoint quite often make the move from an inferiority complex to a superiority complex, and this eventually fosters self-righteous behavior, contempt for other states and an aggressive foreign policy. American foreign policy practices of the past year--the invasion of Grenada, the participation in the armed aggression against the Lebanese people, the undeclared war against Nicaragua, the blackmailing of Cuba, the deployment of land-based American medium-range missiles in Western Europe and the preparations for the deployment of sea-based cruise missiles near the coast of Japan represent the other side of the inferiority complex which became a superiority complex long ago--and not without the help of "neonationalists" on all levels--and turned into an obsession with strength and the feeling that the Republican administration can do anything it wants in the foreign policy sphere.

Focusing attention on the programmed, fabricated image of the "enemy," nationalism, in its interaction with ethnocentrism, can influence not only U.S. foreign policy in general but also the actual process of foreign policy decisionmaking in specific situations. This makes this mechanism extremely dangerous, particularly under the conditions of the heightened international friction of the 1980's. "The perception of a new enemy, more menacing than the old one," B. Glad said in reference to U.S. practices, "influences the decisionmaking process on the highest level. It can lead to changes in blocs and alliances, to heightened interest in enemy plans and to the mobilization of political and military resources against the enemy. At the highest level of stress, when life or death decisions must be made as quickly as possible and when a 'crisis' arises, cognitive processes display a marked tendency to impede the ability of the decisionmaker to coordinate his views of the outside world with the threat and realistically assess all possible reactions to it."20

The cycle of different but interrelated politico-psychological complexes certainly does not undergo a single process of development either in its objective evolution or in its manipulation from above--by the administration and the mass media. It occurs repeatedly and serves as the rotor in the process

of U.S. foreign policymaking and the pursuit of this policy, particularly under the current administration.

It is interesting to examine the same politico-psychological cycle in White House foreign policy during the history of the "Vietnam syndrome." It was this precise history that became a symbol of the arbitrary and completely contradictory game the "neonationalists" were playing with the mass mentality in American society and, to some degree, with the thinking of the ruling elite, particularly in the sphere of foreign policy propaganda outside the United States. It is possible that the political elite deliberately chose a purely psychological (or even pathopsychological) term to describe its military and political failure so as to alleviate the severe effects of this failure and indicate that its after-effects would only be psychological. They used this term to explain the reluctance of U.S. political groups to become involved in international conflicts similar to the one in Vietnam. They also used it to explain the antiwar movement in the United States. This entire multipurpose complex connected with the "Vietnam syndrome" also reflected the White House's desire to sit back and wait for better times and deceive world public opinion into believing that Washington had learned a lesson from the lost war.

Rightwing American political scientists R. Tucker and W. Watts seemed to agree that the defeat in Vietnam gave Washington an obviously mistaken view of security, because it was "almost diametrically opposed to real security interests." But even they had acknowledged this, they nevertheless asserted that the imperious interest, the highest value in their opinion, should "eventually explain Vietnam."²¹

Many acknowledgements of the "Vietnam trauma" have been accumulated in the United States. Famous neoconservative ideologist I. Kristol predicted back in the late 1970's that U.S. foreign policy would "never be the same" after this trauma.²² In the opinion of another American political scientist, R. Rosecrance, the "Vietnam trauma" and some other developments put an end to the "self-evident American leadership in the world. The American Age was over."²³

These statements and assertions had some basis. The defeat in Vietnam marked the end of an entire period in the development and use of U.S. military force and interventionism in foreign political affairs. This was reflected in the political thinking of the ruling elite and in the mass political mentality of American society.

However, the Democrats and the Republicans who succeeded them in the White House have already been able to overcome the "Vietnam syndrome" to a considerable extent. They have not renounced the policy of military force or the attempt to regain military superiority by disrupting the strategic balance and organizing direct and indirect interventionist actions. Apparently, the "Vietnam syndrome" had a definite effect on the thinking of U.S. ruling circles for less than 5 years. After some time had passed, the same R. Tucker made the following significant statement: "Of course, there is intervention and there is intervention. The desire to avoid future Vietnams is one thing;

the desire to avoid future intervention is quite another. The greatest difficulty encountered in post-Vietnam policies was the failure of attempts to draw this distinction."²⁴ The Carter Administration announced that it had overcome the "Vietnam syndrome," but the Reagan Administration set out to prove it. Both administrations openly used military force in international relations to get rid of the ideological, political and psychological effects of the "Vietnam syndrome."

The nationalism of the new stage, reflected in the tougher confrontation style of American foreign and military policies, was one of the methods U.S. ruling circles used to rid themselves of the "Vietnam syndrome." An outburst of nationalism in the United States marked the period of the Iranian-American crisis in 1979. Nationalist emotions were stirred up by the U.S. military actions against Lebanon and Grenada, the assistance of counterrevolutionaries in Afghanistan, the assistance of South Africa in its aggressive actions against Angola and Mozambique and the policy of economic sanctions against the USSR and Poland. "Neonationalism" determined the political climate in Washington when the administration demanded an arms buildup on the pretext of the "growth of Soviet military strength."

The most visible sign that the Reagan Administration had been cured of the "Vietnam syndrome" was the operation against Grenada. "It is clear that the Reagan Administration regards the operation in Grenada as a simultaneous test of its own military doctrine and of domestic political feelings. If the reaction to the invasion is limited or muffled, the administration will be certain that the 'Vietnam syndrome' has finally been overcome and that Americans will accept a policy of global intervention--the 'Grenada Doctrine,'"²⁵ American researcher M. Klare said. Ascertaining the appearance of the "Grenada syndrome" in U.S. foreign policy, engendered during the administration's purposeful efforts to "displace" the unpleasant "Vietnam syndrome," the same researcher wrote: "The logic of the 'Grenada syndrome' presupposes the continued U.S. willingness to intervene anytime and anywhere 'U.S. vital interests' are threatened."²⁶ An editorial in THE NATION stated: "The Grenada landing destroyed the political and psychological barriers which had luckily caused presidents to refrain from military ventures since the days of Vietnam."²⁷

The American administration's actions in the international arena to get rid of the "Vietnam syndrome" not only revealed the real purpose of "neonationalism" but also disclosed the alarming prospects it presents.

Another function of "neonationalism" is connected with Washington's hope of diverting ideological, political and psychological attention in the country to the external enemy and thereby transferring negative public feelings from domestic to foreign targets (the more we hate "them," the more we love "ourselves" and "our own").

On the eve of the presidential elections, it is evident that the nationalism of the new stage, including its politico-psychological aspects, which has become such an integral part of U.S. politics and ideology on the most diverse levels, has led to serious foreign policy reversals, subjected this policy to

dangerous shifts and created an exceptionally complex and dangerous situation in international relations.

FOOTNOTES

1. R. Tucker, "The Purposes of American Power," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter 1980/81, p 262.
2. G. Hall, "Imperialism Today. An Evaluation of Major Issues and Events of Our Time," N.Y., 1972, p 143.
3. The concept of ethnocentrism was introduced into the social sciences at the beginning of the century by W. Sumner, the most prominent representative of social-Darwinism in the United States. The main categories of Sumner's theory were the "we groups" and "they groups." Sumner tried to formulate the general laws of relations between different human communities, from the family to the nation and state (see S. K. Roschin, "Zapadnaya psikhologiya kak instrument ideologii i politiki" [Western Psychology as an Instrument of Ideology and Policy], Moscow, 1980, pp 94-95).

In this case, ethnocentrism is an attribute of ethnic or national awareness, present in a particularly extreme form in U.S. history, leading to the perception and evaluation of all phenomena, including, or even primarily, conditions in the international arena, exclusively through the prism of the traditions and values of one's own nation, which serves as a general standard for other nations. Obviously, even in the purely psychological sense, ethnocentrism cannot be viewed in isolation from socioeconomic and political factors, as American bourgeois researchers are inclined to do (see, for example, D. Campbell, "Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes and Group Behavior," N.Y., 1971).

4. B. Glad, "Black and White Thinking: Ronald Reagan's Approach to Foreign Policy," POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, 1983, No 1, p 48.
5. S. Hoffman, "No Choice, No Illusions," FOREIGN POLICY, Winter 1976/77, p 99.
6. American sociologists usually combine the petty and middle bourgeoisie and the high-paid elite of the working class, including salaried bureaucrats, in the "middle class." Of course, this is a non-Marxist concept and it has nothing in common with the actual class structure of American society. From the psychological standpoint, however, this concept can be used conditionally to point up the homogeneous foreign policy views of these groups in American society, infected by the nationalist mentality and great-power chauvinism. The class essence of the "middle class" consists in the conviction of the social strata making up this class that an active foreign policy, conducted in the interests of monopolist capital, is an integral element of the struggle to preserve the status quo in the United States and America's place in the world (for more detail, see

- V. A. Kremenyuk and G. A. Trofimenko, "The Class Essence of Foreign Policy," in the book "Sovremennaya vneshnyaya politika SShA" [Contemporary U.S. Foreign Policy], vol 1, Moscow, 1984, pp 26-27).
7. E. Ladd, "205 and Going Strong," PUBLIC OPINION, June/July 1981, p 11.
 8. B. Glad, Op. cit., p 38.
 9. P. Nitze, "Policy and Strategy from Weakness," in "National Security in the 1980's. From Weakness to Strength," edited by W. Scott Thompson, San Francisco, 1980, p 449.
 10. P. Berger, "Democracy for Everyone?" COMMENTARY, September 1983, p 31.
 11. C. Bell, "The Diplomacy of Detente. The Kissinger Era," N.Y., 1977, p 23.
 12. N. Podhoretz, "Making the World Safe for Communism," COMMENTARY, April 1976, p 40.
 13. R. Scheer, "With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War," N.Y., 1982, p 35 (see a digest of this book in SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1984, No 2--Editor's note).
 14. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 8 March 1983.
 15. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, July 1983, p 66.
 16. Frustration is a psychological state of oppressive tension, anxiety, depression and despair. It arises in situations interpreted by individuals of social groups as irreversible threats to their goals. A state of frustration can be manifested in the form of anger or hostile behavior ("Filosofskiy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar'" [Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Terms], Moscow, 1983, p 750; "Experimental Psychology," edited and compiled by P. Fresse and J. Piaget, translated from the French, vol 5, Moscow, 1975, pp 80-84).
 17. "Theory and Research on the Causes of War," edited by D. Pruitt and R. Snyder, N.Y., 1969, p 31.
 18. D. Nuechterlein, "The Republican Future," COMMENTARY, January 1983, p 22.
 19. W. Scott Thompson, "Toward a Strategic Peace," in "National Security in the 1980's," p 476.
 20. B. Glad, Op. cit., p 37.
 21. "Beyond Containment. U.S. Foreign Policy in Transition," edited by R. Tucker and W. Watts, Wash., 1973, p XXV.
 22. THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 12 May 1968.

23. "America as an Ordinary Country. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Future," edited by R. Rosecrance, Ithaca and London, 1976, p 11.
24. R. Tucker, "The Purposes of American Power. An Essay on National Security," N.Y., 1981, p 33.
25. M. Klare, "The Grenada Syndrome," THE NATION, 12 November 1983, p 454.
26. Ibid.
27. THE NATION, 5 November 1983, p 420.

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FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 84 (signed to press 20 Sep 84) pp 64-70

[Article by S. A. Losev: "Foreign Policy and Elections"]

[Text] Immediately after he was nominated as the Democratic Party's presidential candidate, W. Mondale proposed to R. Reagan, who is seeking re-election for a second term, that several televised debates be held on various issues, "ranging from arms control to environmental protection." In this connection he ranked foreign policy problems in first place: U.S. policy in Central America and in southern Africa, the state of Soviet-American relations, the excessively inflated military spending, and so forth.

What has prompted this approach? It is the state of the economy that usually has a decisive effect on the mood of American voters. "Whenever the Americans go to the polls," the weekly TIME magazine remarked, "they think about their pocketbooks. Like any other problem, the economy can sharply increase or destroy the President's chances of re-election."

In the current campaign as well, the Republican administration is speculating with some revival of economic activity following a prolonged depression. The Reagan Administration's socioeconomic policy as a whole has indisputably dealt a painful blow to the interests of the poor segments of the U.S. population. The programs of social security, unemployment compensation, medical assistance for the aged and education have been drastically reduced. During the years of Reagan's administration, the number of Americans living in poverty has risen by 5 million, and 10 million people have been deprived of their right to health insurance. The real earnings of those who have succeeded in keeping their jobs have been reduced by 3.5 percent. The number of farm bankruptcies has tripled. The crisis, further aggravated by racism, has turned into a disaster for the blacks, the Mexican-Americans and other minorities.

At the same time, as a result of Reagan's policy of making the poor poorer and the rich richer, the incomes of corporations, especially those working on defense contracts, have reached an average annual total of 2 trillion dollars. The monopolies and the top levels of the bourgeois middle class have gained from the large tax reductions for corporate profits. Here and there something has fallen from the table of the monopolies to the "blue-collar" workers--that is, to the highly skilled and relatively well-paid workers.

Even according to official statistics, there are still more than 8 million unemployed. At the same time, in the period since November 1982, when the slump reached its lowest point, unemployment has been reduced--as a result of the economic revival--from 10.7 to 7.5 percent--that is, it has been reduced to the level of the time when Reagan took office. But this reduction is nevertheless portrayed as an achievement of the incumbent master of the White House. For example, at his press conference on 24 July Reagan juggled the facts and claimed that now "7 million more Americans have jobs than in 1980."

Everyone in the government and outside knows that an economic revival based on an enormous budget deficit and high bank interest rates is very fragile and that a new slump is imminent. According to economic forecasts, however, it will come after the November elections at the earliest and will not affect the outcome of the elections.

The Democratic Party, which--just as the Republican Party--primarily represents the interests of big capital, has not provided and could not provide a real alternative to the policy of the Reagan Administration in the socio-economic sphere.

Therefore, objective circumstances have placed foreign policy issues at the center of the election campaign. This turn of events certainly does not suit the administration. This is obvious if the thin veneer of feigned self-assurance is removed from the many official statements of recent months. The stereotypical optimistic phrases about mythical foreign policy successes cannot conceal the glaring failures. A careful examination of the changes in the foreign policy leadership under the Reagan Administration indicates that these changes have been extremely significant. G. Shultz replaced A. Haig as secretary of state and M. Armacost replaced L. Eagleburger as assistant secretary of state. Reagan's close friend W. Clark, who distinguished himself with his amazing ignorance of foreign policy matters, replaced R. Allen as the President's assistant for national security affairs and then himself ceded this position to R. McFarlane. P. Habib, the President's special envoy for the Middle East, and G. Stone, the special envoy for Latin America, also resigned.

There were concrete reasons for each change in the foreign policy team. To some extent, this is an indication of the incessant squabbles in the immediate vicinity of the President. But the main thing is that these changes reflect the foreign policy miscalculations of the current administration.

In his 23 July interview for UPI, U.S. Vice-President G. Bush acknowledged that East-West relations would be a major issue in the campaign. Asked why he thought so, Bush answered with irritation: "Because I heard that nauseating rhetoric at the Democratic convention: They attacked the President over and over again on the issues of war and peace."

Despite the shameless anti-Soviet propaganda, the alarming thought that the Reagan Administration is a government of war is gradually sinking into the consciousness of the American people. According to a public opinion poll

conducted by the Harris service in July this year, 58 percent of the Americans had a negative view of the administration's approach to relations with the USSR, 56 percent did not approve of the way in which Reagan is conducting U.S. foreign policy and 63 percent disapproved of administration policy in the sphere of nuclear arms control.

The aggravated threats to peace are causing deep anxiety in the U.S. population, just as in other peoples, although not everyone is aware as yet that these threats are a direct result of the course pursued by aggressive circles of U.S. imperialism, the course aimed at confrontation, at arms race escalation, at military superiority and at the infringement of the independence and freedom of peoples, the course of expansionism and diktat.

Fearing the exposure of the true essence of its militarist policy, Washington has recently had to maneuver and make demagogic statements about its commitment to a dialogue with the USSR and about its imaginary interest in arms limitation and reduction. It is with the aid of this pseudo-peaceful rhetoric, which is not backed up by any real willingness to solve urgent problems on a mutually acceptable basis, that the Republican administration would like to cover up its unprecedented arms buildup and to dupe and attract voters. The false rhetoric does not, however, change Washington's position, still dictated primarily by the desire for military superiority. Relying on force in world affairs, American imperialism is encouraging chauvinism and racism, making room for revanchism and neofascism and elevating terrorism to the level of state policy.

Let us recall that the 1980 election platform of the Republican Party stated quite frankly that "achieving general military and technological superiority over the Soviet Union" is the main goal of the United States. Later on, the people on the Potomac began to discuss this less and less frequently and in more vague terms, and gradually began using such artful terms as closing the "window of vulnerability," creating a "reserve of strength" and so forth. The goal, however, has not changed.

At his meeting in the White House with editors of regional publications and managers of radio and television companies in the summer of 1984, Reagan declared: "We are making every effort to imbue American foreign policy with new strength, new firmness and a new sense of purpose.... Recently the chief editor of the NEW REPUBLIC successfully summed up our foreign policy. He wrote that our administration 'has changed the relationship of forces on the world scene to the advantage of America.'"

As we can see, the President wholly subscribed to the view of that editor and even went beyond the mere acknowledgement of the fact that the objective of U.S. ruling circles is military superiority. He did not hesitate to claim that the goal had already been attained. It is clear, however, that the United States has set itself an unattainable goal. Imperialism has not succeeded and will not succeed in changing the world balance of power.

"But their hopes are in vain," Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of defense,

said on 20 July. "The Soviet Union will never allow superiority over itself."

Many American political observers have now been forced to admit the failure of Washington's plans to obtain major concessions from the Soviet Union by means of pressure and by the actual deployment of American new first-strike missiles in Western Europe. The countermeasures taken in good time by the USSR have demonstrated the absurdity of the American attempts. The only thing that the administration succeeded in achieving was wrecking the Geneva talks, and the entire responsibility for that falls on the U.S. administration.

"From his very first day in the White House," NEW YORK TIMES reporter A. Lewis noted, "President Reagan has acted in the belief that the more he insults and threatens the Russians, the quicker military arsenals will grow and the more success he will have in relations with the Russians. Predictably, however, this policy of forcible pressure has not worked. The notion that the Soviet Union can be intimidated turned out to be a vain fantasy having nothing in common with reality.... Every sensible person knows that negotiations are not some kind of concession to the Russians but an objective necessity engendered by our common interest in survival. It is precisely for this reason that Reagan must be held responsible for the creation of a hostile atmosphere with all of the ensuing consequences."

As the elections draw nearer, the White House makes more persistent attempts to convince the voters that the security of the United States has allegedly improved as a result of the current administration's policy. At a briefing on Soviet-American relations for American journalists, a high-level member of the administration alleged that "the security of the United States has been stronger for some time."

The real security of states and especially the security against nuclear war, however, cannot be guaranteed by the escalation of the arms race or by persistent attempts to break the existing approximate balance of forces in the military-strategic sphere to one's own advantage.

The problem of security is worrying the Americans more and more. According to the NBC television company, "the question of whether Americans are more secure now than they were 4 years ago is a matter of great concern to the managers of the President's campaign. The public believes it is not more secure, and this is a major problem for the White House."

The fact is that the present administration has not concluded or ratified a single agreement in the sphere of nuclear arms limitation. It has contrived to wipe out Soviet-American relations, disrupted the nuclear arms limitation and reduction process that was initiated with such great effort in the 1970's, wrecked the talks on arms limitation in Europe and START and questioned the validity of the ABM treaty. Washington is blocking the conclusion of agreements at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, it has deadlocked the Vienna talks on the reduction of armaments and armed forces in Europe, it is pursuing an obstructionist policy at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures, Security and Disarmament in Europe and it is blocking the implementation of the Soviet proposal on the non-use of force.

To camouflage this dangerous policy and mislead the voters, official U.S. propaganda, fed by the White House and State Department, makes extensive use of the methods of premeditated misinformation. Lies are produced as smoothly as on a conveyor belt. They try to portray every Soviet-American diplomatic contact as evidence that the administration is not only able to conduct normal business with the Soviet Union but is also moving closer to concrete agreements. Speaking at a national convention of young governors, Reagan claimed with an air of secrecy that "little by little, we are trying to hold negotiations and discussions with the Soviet Union on many fronts."

But what is the real state of affairs? The authors of these lies know perfectly well that only relatively trivial and peripheral matters are being discussed as a matter of routine. For instance, an agreement has been reached on the technical perfection of the existing direct communication line between the USSR and the United States, the so-called "hot line," by introducing a facsimile communication line in addition to the existing telegraph line. But no major problem in Soviet-American relations or arms limitation is being discussed at present because the American side has blocked every attempt to move toward agreements and has no intention of changing its negative position.

The deployment of the Pershing-II and cruise missiles in the FRG, Great Britain and Italy continues in full swing. What are the White House's hypocritical declarations of "willingness" to resume "at any time" the arms limitation talks in Geneva worth under these conditions?

The Soviet Union is in favor of serious negotiations and has always objected to turning negotiations into a screen to cover up a militarist policy and a nuclear arms buildup. The USSR's well-known proposals provide the foundation for genuine negotiations on the basis of mutually acceptable conditions and for genuine agreement.

The third edition of the booklet "Whence the Threat to Peace" notes that the USSR has proposed to reduce the number of nuclear weapon carriers by about two-thirds (down to 300 units) with an equal sublevel for missiles. The Soviet side has also agreed to liquidate its reducible missiles in Europe and put a freeze on the number of SS-20 missiles in the East as soon as an agreement on nuclear arms limitation and reduction in Europe goes into effect. In this connection the Soviet Union is prepared to have no more warheads on its intermediate-range missiles than the number of warheads on missiles in Britain and France during each stage of negotiations. And since at the time of the talks they had 420-430 warheads and each SS-20 missile has 3 warheads, the USSR agreed to leave only 140 missile launchers in Europe, or even fewer than would remain in England and France (162). The implementation of the Soviet proposal would radically lower the level of the nuclear forces opposing one another in Europe, and in this connection the missile level could be below the level of 1976, when nothing was being said in the West about the Soviet Union's "missile superiority."

Therefore, the Soviet Union has done everything in its power to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. But the United States has rejected these proposals. It wrecked the Geneva talks by beginning the deployment of its missiles.

G. Shultz, U.S. secretary of state, has claimed that "the Soviet Union has set preliminary conditions for the resumption of the talks, asking that we (the United States) accept an enormous inequality as a result of the massive deployment of missiles which the Soviet Union has carried out and is still carrying out."

This is another lie. It is Washington, and not Moscow, that is setting preliminary conditions by insisting that the Geneva talks should be resumed in a situation in which the United States and NATO are turning Western Europe into a bridgehead for a first strike against the Warsaw Pact countries. We are essentially being asked to discount the new American intermediate-range missiles, the forward-based weapons (651 carriers), and to close our eyes to the 162 missiles in Britain and France that are capable of hitting targets in European socialist countries with more than 400 nuclear warheads.

A unique key to an understanding of the present American approach to the very process of arms limitation talks is provided by the utterly cynical statement by Kenneth Adelman, head of the American Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. "The nuclear arms limitation talks," he said, "are only a trick we have resorted to in order to reassure the American people and the European allies."

But the Soviet Union will not participate in any such trickery or the deception of the public. The Geneva talks can be resumed at any time but the United States must first remove the obstacles it has created by deploying the new missiles in Europe.

Washington is still maneuvering in every way possible to avoid the important issue of talks on the prevention of the militarization of outer space. It is no secret that the United States began the militarization of space and has spent around 60 billion dollars on its military space programs since the end of the 1950's. As soon as Reagan took office, the Pentagon stepped up its plans to transfer the arms race to outer space. To cover up the "star wars" programs, rumors are being spread that the United States is developing space weapons only because the USSR is working on similar projects. For example, the propaganda materials of the U.S. Information Agency the American embassies abroad distributed in July this year claim that "the Soviet Union is the only country in the world with a tested antisatellite weapon system. Therefore, the moratorium on antisatellite weapon tests proposed by the Soviets would secure them an exclusive monopoly on these weapons."

All of this is a deliberate deception. The U.S. administration's negative reaction to the Soviet Government's new proposal to begin talks--on 18 September 1984 in Geneva--aimed at working out and concluding an agreement to prevent the militarization of outer space, including a complete mutual renunciation of antisatellite systems and a moratorium on their testing, once again conclusively proves that the United States is trying to develop an arms race in space in order to achieve first-strike potential.

Of course, the White House could not openly reject the Soviet proposal on the eve of the elections. Reagan has even alleged that he accepted the Soviet proposal on the commencement of talks in September "without any preliminary

conditions." In fact, however, Washington has set a preliminary condition by demanding that the talks on outer space be combined with the talks on medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and on strategic arms--in other words, with the talks it has wrecked--and is thereby trying to bury the Soviet proposal on the prevention of the militarization of space.

This plan became perfectly clear to the world public when the Soviet side proposed the simultaneous publication in Moscow and Washington of a joint Soviet-American announcement that would clearly state the agreement of the USSR and the United States to start talks aimed at drafting and concluding an agreement to prevent the militarization of outer space, including a complete mutual renunciation of antisatellite systems, as well as the agreement to declare a mutual moratorium on the testing and development of space weapons on the first day of the talks. If the United States had really accepted the Soviet proposal "without any preliminary conditions," as the President alleged, the American side should have no objections to this kind of joint announcement. The American counter draft of the announcement, however, did not even include the very term "outer space," let alone anything about the prevention of its militarization or a moratorium on tests of space weapons. Instead of that, a vague wording was proposed about some kind of "meeting to discuss and determine the approach to the negotiations," and in this connection the subject of the negotiations was not made clear. As the 27 July TASS statement notes, the purpose of this wording is clear: the avoidance of talks on the vitally important issue of a space weapon ban, as proposed by the Soviet Union, by substituting a general discussion about everything that comes up and about nothing specific, and all in the interest of current U.S. goals having nothing to do with ending the arms race. The United States began by wrecking the Geneva talks on nuclear arms and now it is making the commencement of talks on outer space in Vienna impossible.

On the eve of the elections, Washington would like to conduct talks for the sake of talks merely to gain votes. As THE WASHINGTON POST commented, quoting an official member of the administration, the White House considers it politically important for Reagan to "appear to be a statesman who wants to talk to Moscow," even if no such talks begin.

The U.S. approach to other fundamental problems in Soviet-American relations and international issues is also built on deception. G. Smith, former director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, drew the following conclusion from an analysis of the U.S. proposals on nuclear arms limitation in Europe, on strategic arms limitation and reduction and on the chemical weapon ban: "All three of these proposals have certain features in common. At first glance, they seem reasonable, especially to the uninformed. But in fact, as the informed experts see it, they are all onesided and cannot be a topic of discussion...because they are aimed at forcing the USSR to fundamentally restructure its strategic arsenal while they demand nothing of the kind from the United States."

Pursuing the cause of Soviet-American confrontation, the Reagan Administration, taking a position of state terrorism, is simultaneously escalating tension in various regions. Its service record in the foreign policy sphere is crowded with blunders and mistakes.

The "Lebanon debut," an attempt at creeping armed intervention, ended in failure and, following the explosion at the headquarters of the American Marines in Beirut, the interventionists decided to go back home.

According to public opinion polls, 7 out of every 10 Americans think that the events in Central American could turn into another Vietnam for the United States. With a view to these feelings, W. Mondale promised at the Democratic Party convention in San Francisco that he would fight for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Central America and promised that, if elected, he would stop the unlawful war in Nicaragua within the first 100 days.

In the fall of 1980, Reagan was bursting to hold television debates with J. Carter, the incumbent President and the Democratic Party candidate for a new term. But now, as the American press has noted, he is by no means eager for television debates with Democratic candidate W. Mondale. The present master of the White House obviously has good reasons for this.

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REPUBLICAN CONVENTION

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 84 (signed to press 20 Sep 84) pp 70-75

[Article by N. D. Turkatenko (Washington)]

[Text] An important event in U.S. politics will take place in a month. The presidential election and elections for one-third of the Senate and the House of Representatives will be held in November. Their results will affect not only the domestic political situation but also the leading capitalist state's policy line in matters of war and peace, affecting the interests of the United States as well as the entire international community. After all, the possibility of a constructive search for long-overdue solutions to problems of vital importance to all states and peoples will depend largely on Washington policy.

We should recall that many of the specific foreign policy aims and guidelines of the current administration were established by the Democratic administration of J. Carter. The Carter Administration, in which the vice-president was W. Mondale, the current Democratic presidential candidate, also announced its aim of ridding America of the "Vietnam syndrome" and elaborated and tried to implement the doctrines and concepts of the "protection of U.S. vital interests" in all parts of the world. It was precisely the Carter Administration that invented the theory of the "crescent of crisis," stretching from Latin America to the African countries, the Middle East, India and Pakistan, issued classified and unclassified directives and planned the buildup of U.S. military strength and broader intervention by Washington in the affairs of other countries and peoples.

It is true that people in the United States and everywhere else in the world remember the Carter Administration as one subject to constant vacillation. Its foreign policy line was full of reversals. After all, the lessons of Vietnam were still too clear in the memories of Americans. At that time, even American officials admitted that the dirty war against the people of Indochina was a "tragic mistake." They recalled that it had been started by the Johnson Administration after it was able to fool the Congress with false information about attacks on American ships in Vietnamese waters and to push the "Tonkin Resolution" through the Congress.

At that time the members of the administration and the ruling elite who "made" policy were still heeding the warnings of such experienced men as W. Fulbright, G. Kennan and A. Harriman that the obsession with imperious ambitions, the intoxication with power and the reluctance or inability to consider the realities of today's world could be dangerous for the United States. But memories of the past and these warnings were diluted considerably in the wave of chauvinism and patriotic jingoism the "new" and old Right whipped up in the United States on the orders and with the strong financial support of the most aggressive imperialist groups, a wave which was whipped up even more by the seizure of the American hostages in Tehran. As certain degree of uncertainty about domestic and foreign policy goals and the methods of attaining them can also be seen in the current Democratic platform, which has already been discussed in our magazine and which does, in any case, propose some reasonable steps in matters of war and peace.

In contrast to this, the platform approved by the Republican Party convention in Dallas (20-23 August), where Ronald Reagan was nominated for a second term, does not display any doubts, hesitation or other "mental blocks." It is a well-known fact that the current Republican administration's foreign policy has always been based on overt and truly rabid anti-Sovietism and on indefatigable imperious ambitions. These features played a decisive role in the policy of the Reagan "team" and were among the main factors in U.S. domestic and foreign policymaking.

Above all, this applies to the sphere of military organization. This is attested to merely by the military program "built into" the American economy by the Reagan Administration after it had announced its aim of making the United States militarily superior to the Soviet Union--a program with a total cost of around 2 trillion dollars. This program, envisaging an unrestrained arms race, is moving ahead at full speed. In Reagan's campaign address to the American Veterans of Foreign Wars on 24 August, he reported that the first new strategic B-1 bomber would come off the assembly line in September, that four Trident nuclear submarines had already been put in operation and another seven were being built and that active preparations were being made for the deployment of the new strategic MX missile.

Vietnam is now being portrayed in Washington as a "glorious page in the history of the American Armed Forces." It is as if no one remembers the bloody massacre in Songmy, the barbarous bombing and the criminal use of napalm and chemical weapons against the civilian population.

As for the current administration's feelings about a sphere of U.S. foreign policy as important as nuclear arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union, they were expressed quite clearly when the United States began to deploy Pershing-II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, made the continuation of talks with the USSR on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe and START impossible and rejected the proposal of talks on the prevention of the militarization of space. These feelings were also apparent in Ronald Reagan's "joke," when the head of state, who should carefully weigh the consequences of everything he says, tested a microphone by making a statement he had been longing to make for years. "My fellow Americans," he announced, "I am

pleased to tell you that I have signed legislation that would outlaw Russia forever. We begin bombing in 5 minutes."

In general, it is no secret that Reagan Administration policy in the international arena is hegemonic, undemocratic and, quite frankly, incendiary. There is what could be called a basic formula which deserves repeating before we move on to the details of the Republican campaign platform, declaring the party's goals and objectives if Reagan should somehow be elected for a second term. Nothing is sacred but money--this is what some "pragmatic" Americans are thinking to themselves. The word "money" in this context does not signify means of subsistence, of course; it signifies capital. And if all of the ideological, propagandist and other trappings of Washington's military and foreign policies are discarded, the center will fit a simple formula: the protection and advancement of the interests of American capital by any means and methods everywhere--both at home and in the outside world.

The methods to which the Reagan Administration resorts to attain its goals in the world arena and to psychologically brainwash the population of its own country are fairly well known. They include the scarecrow of the "Soviet threat," the accusation of any movement with the aim of liberation from American political and economic diktat of "terrorism" and the willingness to sacrifice human lives, as in the case of the South Korean airliner sent on an espionage mission a year ago to the air space above the Soviet Far East or in the case of the intervention in Lebanon.

Debates over how effective or ineffective these methods and means of "protecting U.S. national interests" have been allotted a prominent place in speeches by statesmen and politicians, in discussions (including those criticizing administration policy) and in the mass media. But in all of these years, we have never heard of any serious discussion of the chief aim of these means and methods in the presence of a fairly large audience. And although this chief aim is not a secret in general, it is not realized by most of the American voting public, at least not by the people with no direct involvement in these "vital interests." The allegations that the arms buildup will promote the "restoration of American authority in the world" and the cause of "peace and freedom" are unfortunately accepted at face value by many Americans. These people would have to study "boring" and obscure statistics to realize that the arms buildup is being conducted for the purpose of protecting the interests of American capital abroad and is dictated by the military-industrial complex. These statistics testify in the language of numbers that the use of American strength is the power basis of attempts to preserve the status quo or change development trends in the ways needed by American capital throughout the "crescent of crisis."

Let us look, for example, at the invasion of Grenada, which was depicted as "the liberation of the island from totalitarianism." It evoked an outburst of patriotic jingoism and chauvinistic feelings, even in many average Americans. But they would understand more about this "fight for freedom" if they were to read, for example, the section entitled "The U.S. Position in Foreign Investments" in the latest issue of the official publication SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS. It frankly points out the extremely important role of branches of American banks in the Caribbean--precisely where Grenada is

located--in the international expansion of American capital. As soon as commercial activity was revived, we read, funds were again sent abroad, particularly to the Caribbean.

Statements about the need to "protect national interests" sound patriotic but somewhat abstract to the average voter. They mean something completely different to those who know their real meaning and have a direct relationship to these interests. These people are just as aware as the authors of the SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS report that private American assets abroad were already worth 774.4 billion dollars at the end of 1983, with the developing countries accounting for 356.8 billion. The direct investments of American monopolies in the developing countries alone totaled 68.7 billion dollars and annually produce a profit of at least 12 percent. In this vast region of the capitalist world, American capital occupies extremely important positions, the dominant position in many countries. This is why the American brand of stability is needed there.

If we try to remove the protective covering of ideological and other rationalizations in the foreign policy section of the campaign platform approved at the Republican Party convention, the enthusiastic statements about "struggle for freedom," "human rights," "peace" and "negotiating with the USSR from a position of strength"--the phrases the Republicans are addressing to the voters--we will clearly see the vulgar concern with capital's future.

The Republican platform, according to the press, was drawn up by extreme rightwing party ideologists under the personal supervision of Ronald Reagan. Its most active authors include Senators B. Goldwater (Arizona), who was one of the "stars" of the convention when he made statements like "extremism is not a defect in the defense of liberty," and W. Armstrong (Colorado), Congressmen J. Kemp (New York), who is being groomed for the presidential nomination in 1988, N. Gingrich (Georgia) and V. Weber (Minnesota), and the President's National Security Adviser R. McFarlane. The aspirations of these "ideologists" as they are reflected in the platform can be broken down into a few basic and interrelated aims.

The first is embellished with the far from new slogan of "peace from a position of strength." The platform not only extols the unprecedented arms race the Reagan Administration started, but also indicates plans for its continued intensification on earth and in outer space. It praises what it calls "Reagan's new and bold defense initiative," envisaging the deployment of weapons in space to "safeguard U.S. security." It openly states the intention to expand the American military presence in all parts of the world and to involve the NATO allies, Japan and the PRC more extensively in U.S. geopolitical strategy. The acknowledgement of the importance of talks with the Soviet Union is immediately "neutralized" by the suggestion of obviously unacceptable and unrealistic terms.

In the sphere of government terrorist activity, the intention to intensify the export of counterrevolution and expand CIA operations is effectively announced. The great "success" of the Grenada invasion is praised to the skies. Threats are addressed to the Soviet Union, Cuba, Nicaragua, patriotic forces in El Salvador, Vietnam, the DPRK, Syria, Libya and the PLO.

The intention to expand the subversive activity of Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe, the Voice of America and Radio Marti, which is supposed to broadcast programs to Cuba and other Caribbean countries, can be relegated to the ideological sphere--or, more precisely, the sphere of escalated psychological warfare. The platform declares the intention to attempt more extensive intervention in the affairs of other countries with the aid of such methods as internal diversion.

There is, as they say, nothing new in all of this. But the platform's precise list of economic policy guidelines, designed to protect "U.S. vital interests" and the position of American capital and capitalism in general, warrants special attention. Any economic aid to developing countries and economic cooperation in general, the platform says, should be offered only to countries whose domestic and foreign policies meet American standards. The main standard is the degree to which these countries secure the necessary conditions for "free enterprise"--that is, for development along capitalist lines. In addition, the platform demands the curtailment of all aid and credit to state enterprises in developing countries.

Which party platform will the voters prefer in November? Who will win the most votes, Reagan or Mondale?

The Democrats chose the foreign policy of the Republican administration as the main theme of their campaign, and they were able in general, judging by public opinion polls, to convince the voters of the dangers of this militarist line and of the stubborn attempts of the Republican leaders and of Reagan himself to ignore the realities of our era. Reagan, the Democrats stress, is the first President in recent years not to conclude a single important agreement with the Soviet Union. He is the first President in 40 years not to meet with Soviet leaders. In essence, he does not know, and does not want to know, anything about the real problems facing the country and the rest of the world. This is why U.S. security, in spite of the buildup of military strength, has grown weaker, and not stronger, during his years in the White House.

The Republicans make references to the administration's "economic achievements." The U.S. economy has shown signs of revival and the levels of inflation and unemployment have dropped in the last year or year and a half. And far from all of the average voters realize that this is a temporary revival, that it is an ordinary cyclical phase which will be followed, inexorably, as the night follows the day, by another recession. How can there be any talk of "new economic frontiers" when the federal budget deficit is almost 200 billion dollars and the national debt has reached the incredible sum of 1.5 trillion?

The Republicans are gambling heavily on strong chauvinistic feelings in the country. The Olympics, incidentally, were used extensively for this purpose. Reagan called the American Olympic athletes "the real American heroes of today." The poison of anti-Sovietism and anticommunism is also doing its job. "Struggle against communist expansion" has been declared the primary national objective of all "God-fearing and respectable Americans." And of course, little is said about the real reasons for the stimulation of anti-communist hysteria, which is supposed to reinforce capitalism's foundations.

One of the vilest examples of this campaign is the movie "Red Dawn," which was made, according to reports here, at the suggestion of General A. Haig, the former secretary of state in the Reagan Administration. This wide-screen movie which is playing to full houses tells the story of the invasion of U.S. territory through Mexico by Soviet, Cuban and Nicaraguan soldiers. The soldiers are portrayed as beasts, and the young Americans who oppose them are naturally fighting for "peace and freedom." The movie is a genuine injection of hatred into the souls of young Americans--that is, those who have already been issued weapons or could be issued weapons for the "protection of U.S. national interests," as was the case in Grenada.

The election campaign has reached its highest pitch. An important feature of the campaign is the increased interest of voters who previously chose not to vote. These are primarily black and Hispanic Americans, who were hit the hardest by the Reagan Administration's all-out assault on the vested interests of broad segments of the American population on the pretext of the need to mobilize forces and resources for the "protection of national interests." The balance of power between the Democrats and Republicans can now be judged only from public opinion polls. They indicate a slight lead for Reagan. The actual balance will be known in the near future.

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MADRID, WASHINGTON AND NATO

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 84 (signed to press 20 Sep 84) pp 75-79

[Article by N. M. Sorokina]

[Text] At the beginning of June the head of the Spanish Government, F. Gonzalez, announced that Spain would not be a member of the NATO military organization and reaffirmed Madrid's adherence to bilateral military agreements with the United States.

Spain's acceptance as a member of the NATO political organization in 1982 was the culmination of a lengthy period of struggle by American and Spanish diplomats for the inclusion of Spain in this bloc. The Socialist election victory of December 1982 stopped the development of this process for some time, however, and the Gonzalez government stopped the country's integration into the military structure of the North Atlantic alliance. Nevertheless, there are several indications of Spain's convergence with NATO. For example, Spanish armed forces have been involved several times in bloc combat maneuvers, and the Spanish military system is being patterned more and more on the NATO model. Military leaders in this country are invariably present at various NATO conferences. In particular, Spain is represented in such bodies as the military committee and military planning committee; in May 1984 the Spanish defense minister and chief of general staff of defense and the Spanish Armed Forces were present at a meeting of the working groups of these committees.

The closer contacts between NATO and Spanish leaders and the constant growth of the Spanish movement against NATO membership forced Madrid to decide whether Spain would remain in NATO. The choice was affected by the collective impact of the domestic situation and the foreign policy position of Spain, the convergence and divergence of Spanish, U.S. and NATO interests and the American policy toward Spain.

Several factors, including the interests of ruling circles in the United States and some West European states, have stimulated Spain's further organizational involvement in the bloc; others--the increasing nostalgia felt by the public and part of the ruling elite in Western Europe for detente, the stronger feelings of pacifism and neutralism on the continent and the Stockholm conference on confidence-building measures, security and disarmament--have shown Spain other possibilities.

The interest of the NATO countries in the membership of this large Southern European state (with a population of 37.7 million and a territory of around 505,000 square kilometers, including several possessions outside Europe) stemmed from a number of factors.

Spain's geographic location, according to NATO strategists, would make it a good rear arsenal and would provide access to major ports, straits and sea lanes in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Spain is also in a convenient location in relation to the Mideast crisis zone.

Purely military advantages were also given the proper assessment by NATO: the country's human potential and favorable conditions for infantry and naval maneuvers and exercises, its possible contribution to the bloc's naval and air potential, etc. NATO's southern flank would be stronger and the bloc's boundaries and sphere of influence would be augmented by the Canary and Balearic islands.

The political aspects of Spain's membership were important to NATO circles. Even partial integration, without inclusion in the military structure, should, according to the calculations of NATO strategists, strengthen the North Atlantic alliance and demonstrate its viability and appeal to other West European states: the "new blood" in NATO should be an indication of good prospects.

According to bloc leaders, Spain's membership in NATO could also have significant ideological implications; NATO was again being portrayed as the guarantor of democracy and as a purely "defensive alliance," outside the framework of which no large West European state could hope to remain sovereign and independent.

In terms of these general criteria, the interests of ruling circles in the United States and the main West European members of the bloc coincide: Both are pursuing a single goal--Spain's full membership in NATO, including the military organization.

In addition, however, the American leadership has its own specific interests. In the first place, by transferring bilateral relations with Spain in the military sphere to a multilateral basis, Washington could urge the allies to assume part of the cost of modernizing Spanish armed forces, developing the NATO infrastructure in Spain, etc. In the second place, it hoped to use the still weak and dependent member of the alliance to support its own line in the bloc. In the third place, the United States wanted to heighten its own influence outside the NATO sphere of action through Spain, with a view to its traditional ties with the Middle East, Latin America and North Africa. In the fourth place, by involving Spain in a Western alliance through NATO instead of the EEC, it hoped to strengthen primarily Atlantic feelings rather than Europeanist ones.

Washington also hopes to gain more favorable opportunities for the use of American military bases in Spain. In the past decade Madrid has not allowed Americans to use these bases in crisis situations in the Middle East and other regions. Considering NATO's military and political practices, however,

the United States could use the "collective will" of bloc members to exert pressure on Spain. It is also possible that Washington could raise the issue of the deployment of American nuclear weapons again under favorable domestic and foreign political conditions (these weapons were removed from Spain in accordance with the 1976 agreement).

The United States has developed many methods of influencing Madrid policy to guarantee that the Spanish Government's decisions in the future will be in the interests of the United States in Europe. For example, all channels of economic influence enter into these calculations. They include the Spanish economy's strong dependence on American capital investments and, in particular, the possibility of exerting pressure on the Spanish peseta. Furthermore, definite prerequisites for this kind of pressure exist in Spain--the resistance of the Socialist government's economic and social reforms by businessmen, Spain's foreign currency drain, etc.

In addition, Washington is trying to bind Madrid with a number of economic and military agreements and projects. In May 1983, for example, the Spanish Government signed a contract for the purchase of 72 F-18A fighter-bombers from the American McDonnell-Douglas company for a total of 1.6 billion dollars. The planes will be delivered in 1986-1988. The United States plans to build a plant in Spain for the manufacture of the spare parts for these combat planes, and this will certainly heighten Madrid's interest in military and economic cooperation with the United States.

At the same time, the United States is trying to impede the development of mutually beneficial contacts between West European countries, including Spain, and the USSR. For example, plans for the U.S. construction of a gas pipeline from North Africa through Spain to France were submitted to Gonzalez. This pipeline could satisfy much of the demand for natural gas in the leading West European countries. To some extent, it is regarded as an alternative to the pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe.

In an attempt to put Madrid in the orbit of its own influence and obtain some control over Spanish policy, Washington has resorted to covert pressure and the use of foreign policy means. One is the close U.S. military cooperation with Morocco, particularly the recent agreement on the use of American military bases in this country. This, considering the old Spanish-Moroccan disagreements over Western Sahara, will have dramatic repercussions in Spain and will cause Spain to seek American support in this dispute. The joint American-Moroccan combat maneuvers, which coincided with the inauguration of the Socialist government in Spain, were viewed by many Spanish observers as a first warning. American-Moroccan maneuvers are conducted quite frequently--recently, several times a year--while large-scale joint American-Spanish maneuvers are conducted once a year.

One strong lever of political pressure on Madrid is its interest in membership in the Common Market. The EEC members, who are also members of NATO, and the United States are striving to make the terms of membership and the very possibility of membership conditional upon the terms of Spanish participation in NATO. The Gibraltar issue is being used in the same way. As an interested party, Spain is seeking better odds in the talks with England by striving to win the support of the United States and other NATO members.

The Spanish Government's reaction to the deployment of the new American medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe, the change in its position on this matter soon after it assumed power in Spain, proves that Washington's pressure has been effective. When Spain was already a member of NATO, it did not sign the joint communique of the bloc members of 10 December 1982, reaffirming the 1979 decision on the "Euromissiles," because the Gonzalez government objected to the deployment of missiles on Spanish territory and opposed membership in the NATO military organization, promising to hold a referendum on bloc membership. The Socialists adhered to this position at first, but during his visit to Washington in June 1983, Gonzalez earned the praise of Ronald Reagan for his "understanding" and "support" of the plans for the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Western Europe. The agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations between Spain and Israel within a reasonable length of time also fits into the general context of agreements with Washington.

Several official, including summit-level, contacts between Washington and Madrid have taken place while the Socialists have been in power. On 24 February 1983 the Gonzalez government and Reagan Administration signed a protocol to the 1982 agreement on friendship, defense and cooperation, which confirmed, with only slight changes, the continuation of Spanish-American military cooperation, including the American use of the air force bases in Torrejon de Ardos, Zaragoza and Moron de la Frontera, the naval base in Rota, the communication center on Menorca and others. An agreement was concluded on 15 contracts for the delivery of various types of American combat equipment and technology to Spain.

The domestic situation in Spain is complicated and changeable. During the period of transition from dictatorship to bourgeois democracy, Spain's withdrawal from NATO and further integration into the bloc structure could have, in Madrid's opinion, created new difficulties. The apparent division of political forces over the issue of participation in NATO has created a constant atmosphere of instability. Leftist forces (socialist and communist) object to membership in the bloc; rightwing parties and groups--the "Popular Alliance" and others--applaud this move. In the army, which is still as important in national politics as it was in Franco's time, feelings about NATO vary depending on, first of all, age (young officers hoping for promotions applaud participation in the alliance) and, secondly, the branch of the armed forces, the commanders of which know that reorganization will strengthen some and weaken others and cause corresponding changes in the scales of their influence. The Gonzalez government has engaged in maneuvers because it does not want to complicate its own position with a clash with the army over the issue of participation in NATO.

For a long time the Socialist government tried to postpone the discussion of this issue in the hope of finding an acceptable solution. Its actions (particularly its steps to reorganize the army and its NATO-oriented defense policy) and its periodic official statements that Spain, as a "reliable" and "loyal" member of NATO, was prepared to honor obligations stemming from participation in the alliance, testified that it was inclined to choose the course imposed on it by the United States and NATO. It is indicative that the

influential Spanish newspaper PAIS advised that a solution to the complex domestic political situation be sought in the reconciliation of the Spanish public's feelings about NATO with the government's opinion. Another solution was to word the referendum in such a way as to exclude direct objections to participation in NATO. Finally, the third alternative was for the government to keep its campaign promises about Spain's withdrawal from the aggressive bloc. In recent months Madrid has made perceptible attempts to underscore Spain's sovereign right to decide its own future and to "thoroughly analyze its strategic needs" with a view to the experience of its neighbors in NATO. Statements have been made to the effect that "Spain's membership in NATO is not at all irrevocable."

Gonzalez' declaration that Spain would not participate in the NATO military organization testifies to attempts to reach a compromise which would be most consistent with Spain's own interests.

Predictably, this aroused Washington's displeasure. The U.S. State Department immediately responded by asserting that Spain's full membership in the bloc was in the interests of Madrid and NATO.

Despite the complexity of Spanish-NATO interrelations, Madrid will sooner or later have to make a choice. The present ambiguity and uncertainty are arousing Washington's desire to intervene in Spanish affairs and to use any opportunity to pressure the Spanish Government to continue participating in NATO and agree to military integration into the bloc.

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PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN CANADA

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 84 (signed to press 20 Sep 84) p 79

[Unattributed report]

[Text] The latest parliamentary elections were held in Canada on 4 September, resulting in heavy losses for the Liberal Party, which has controlled the federal government for many years. It is indicative that the Liberals were defeated even in Quebec, which has been a reliable base of party support since the beginning of the 20th century. The Progressive Conservative Party will now control 211 of the 282 seats in the House of Commons. Its leader, Brian Mulroney, formed a new government.

As for the Liberals, they will be able to keep only 40 of the 146 seats they won in the 1980 elections. Therefore, Liberal leader John Turner will resign from the office of prime minister of Canada.

The New Democratic Party, headed by Edward Broadbent, won 30 seats (32 in 1980).

Among the main reasons for these elections results, the press has noted the recent dramatic increase in public dissatisfaction with the Liberal Party, which was unable to solve the most urgent economic and social problems, such as unemployment, inflation, rising prices, the declining exchange rate of the Canadian dollar and the drop in the standard of living. The press made special mention of the fact that the Liberals had ignored the wishes of the Canadians opposing tests of American cruise missiles in Canada and advocating the transformation of the country into a nuclear-free zone.

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U.S. BOOK ON DETERRENCE POLICY REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 84 (signed to press 20 Sep 84) pp 108-111

[Review by N. N. Nikolayev of book "The Prisoners of Insecurity. Nuclear Deterrence, the Arms Race and Arms Control" by Bruce M. Russett, San Francisco, W. H. Freeman and Company, 1983, XII + 204 pages]

[Text] Various aspects of the official NATO military strategy, the strategy of "flexible response," have been debated much more intensely in political and military-academic circles in the United States and other NATO countries since the end of the 1970's. It was at the turn of the decade that the United States made a complete transition from the policy of mutually beneficial cooperation with the socialist countries and the search for peaceful solutions to problems to the policy of unconcealed preparations for a nuclear war with the USSR. The intense escalation of U.S. military preparations, the disruption of the entire process of arms control and the frank adventurism of American foreign policy are arousing increasing anxiety and alarm not only in broad segments of the world public but also in certain members of the U.S. ruling class, including the supporters of the traditional pursuit of policy from a position of strength.

This book by Yale University Professor of Political Science Bruce Russett deals with the most important problem of the present day--the problem of guaranteeing peace and security and eliminating the danger of nuclear war. The author appeals for the extensive discussion of these matters by broad segments of the U.S. population. He feels it is his duty to help American citizens understand the complex aspects of U.S. military and political strategy (pp IX-XI). How does the author interpret these theories in light of his self-imposed duty?

The American theory of "nuclear intimidation" lies at the basis of Russett's point of view. This alone means that we must approach his arguments with a certain amount of caution. The official aim of NATO is the "intimidation" of the USSR, envisaging the creation of a permanent threat of the use of armed forces on any level, including nuclear strategic forces. Stressing the need to avert the imaginary "threat" posed by the USSR (the structure of Soviet military potential confirms the exclusively defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine), the theory of "intimidation" presupposes the possibility

of a first strike. The present Republican administration's efforts to become militarily superior to the other side are fully in line with this theory. It is quite obvious that this position is an extremely shaky foundation for guaranteed security and the prevention of nuclear war.

In the very beginning of the book the author states that "a mutual balance of terror...is still the main means of deterring nuclear war" (p 19). He believes that the United States and USSR must be capable of a retaliatory strike but should never strive for first-strike potential (p 24). Russett writes: "The presence of first-strike potential on either side would represent a basic threat to the deterrence and prevention of nuclear war" (p 149). Furthermore, Russett feels that the acquisition of first-strike potential is not advisable in the 1980's (p 42), since U.S. and Soviet strategic forces are so great that part of these forces, sufficient to inflict colossal damages on the other side in a retaliatory strike, will certainly survive a surprise nuclear attack (p 4). It is significant that when the author underscores the impossibility of creating first-strike potential in our day, he is actually denying the dangers of the Reagan Administration's militarist policy line, which has precisely this aim.

Russett reminds the reader that there can be no winners in a nuclear war (p 4) and that this kind of war cannot be limited. But even the author's reasonable and sober conclusions and arguments are undermined greatly by his tendency to analyze the strategic situation in the world in isolation from its political context. This characteristic feature of Russett's approach is most apparent in the chapters on the arms race.

Russett agrees with the popular Western belief that the United States and USSR are equally responsible for the arms race. Using various formal theories, including game theory, and extending the concept of the "military-industrial complex" to the USSR, the author views the arms race as a result of the interaction of primarily domestic factors as well as foreign ones. Of course, a researcher representing traditional bourgeois political science cannot be expected to analyze the real socioeconomic and political causes of the current arms race in the world. Russett's disregard for the facts of weapon development and deployment in the postwar years, however, is inconsistent with scientific integrity, and so is his flagrant distortion of the history of Soviet-American relations after World War II.

Nevertheless, the author arrives at a number of completely accurate conclusions about the negative consequences of the arms race. In spite of the U.S. leadership's allegations that the continued stockpiling of weapons cannot cause a war, he admits that "the longer the arms race is allowed to continue, the stronger the danger of potential devastation will be" (pp 59-60). His own line of reasoning, however, causes Russett to conclude that the arms race cannot be stopped (pp 84-85, 92, 94-96).

It is on the basis of this assumption that Russett examines the prospects for arms limitation. The idea that nuclear weapons cannot be banned is a basic element of his approach: "We must realize that the hope of complete nuclear disarmament is basically a fantasy. The knowledge of how a nuclear weapon is

built cannot be buried" (p 189). This argument is probably the most widespread Western conclusion in favor of the impossibility of nuclear disarmament. Even the way in which Russett words the argument does not differ from the phrases used by the leaders of the United States and other NATO countries. As an example, we can take a look at what Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of England said at the second special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament on 23 June 1982: "The world cannot suppress the knowledge it already has about the production of these weapons. This is an irrefutable fact. Nuclear weapons must be regarded as means of deterrence. They contribute to what Winston Churchill a 'balance of fear.'" And on closer examination, Russett's concept also turns out to be nothing other than the same "balance of fear."

It is true that the author has to admit: "In the final analysis, there is no question that there must be some reduction of nuclear arsenals. We cannot indefinitely maintain our current, or greater, destructive capabilities" (p 189). But this admission is more likely to be a sign of common sense on the part of an individual who is sincerely disturbed by the uncontrolled accumulation of nuclear weapons in the world; it is not only inconsistent with Russett's entire line of reasoning but is even a direct contradiction of it. Russett denies the possibility and questions the desirability of the radical reduction of nuclear weapons because this, in his opinion, could reduce the stability engendered by mutual intimidation (pp 188-189). Furthermore, he believes that disarmament can hardly produce the desired results within the context of the present state of Soviet-American relations (pp 169-170). All that is left is for Russett to take the final step of resolutely declaring that nuclear weapons are a universal and irreplaceable means of preventing war and keeping the peace. And he does take this step. He frankly states: "We must continue the search for ways of living with the bomb" (p 190). He sees arms control as one of these ways.

Russett distinguishes between the terms "disarmament" and "arms control." In this respect he adheres completely to the official Western tradition of envisaging, in contrast to the Soviet concept, control over the process by which weapons are accumulated and perfected, but certainly not their reduction. Russett stresses several times that arms control is essential in the prevention of nuclear war. He interprets this primarily as the reinforcement of the stability of mutual nuclear intimidation and the establishment of conditions under which neither side would have the chance or the wish to deliver the first strike (p 168). Russett underscores the importance of limiting the most destabilizing types of weapons, negotiating means of strengthening strategic trust and preventing the accidental use of nuclear weapons and settling conflicts in the relations between the sides (pp 95, 131-132, 168, 189). There is no question that means of strengthening strategic trust are extremely important, but they cannot be regarded as a panacea. They are only part of the complex mechanism guaranteeing international security, in which the main role is played by genuine and substantial arms reductions and genuine disarmament. This will create the best possible conditions for guaranteed trust between states.

Russett mentions several specific fields of arms control where progress can and must be made. His proposals are essentially the following.

First the United States and the USSR should conclude agreements on a total nuclear test ban and a ban on the militarization of outer space (p 184); the United States should renew the ABM limitation treaty (p 40). Russett also supports a proposal popularized by the American antinuclear movement, the proposal of a freeze on the medium-range nuclear weapons of both sides in Europe (p 178). Russett feels that these agreements would be important precisely because they, in his opinion, would help to strengthen the stability of mutual intimidation.

In view of the fact that land-based ICBM's are, in Russett's opinion, vulnerable and could be used as first-strike weapons, the United States should destroy its ICBM's on a unilateral basis (pp 186-187). In particular, he believes that the deployment of the MX missile will not be in the U.S. interest (pp 26-29, 66).

The United States should pledge not to use nuclear weapons first (p 161).

Russett's line of reasoning warrants consideration: He proposes a number of immediate steps to reduce the danger of war. But another characteristic of the author's approach to security is also apparent here: He examines these steps in isolation from political realities. In fact, the author never even mentions the many Soviet efforts to curb the arms race, even though many of his proposals are repetitions of Soviet initiatives.

Russett's statement about no first use of nuclear weapons is particularly helpful in revealing the dual nature of the position he has taken. Some members of the "military-academic complex" of the NATO countries have realized that it would be expedient for the United States and NATO to take this pledge. But they feel that this measure should be taken primarily because it will heighten the effectiveness of conventional NATO potential. Russett adheres to a similar position. He writes: "Nuclear war would probably be tantamount to national suicide and not a rational political act. ...for this reason, vital interests should be protected primarily with the aid of conventional armed forces, and not with nuclear weapons" (p 161). Russett does not exclude the possibility of the use of military force by the United States; he actually presupposes the use of force and feels that more suitable conditions should be established for the use of American general-purpose armed forces.

The duality of the author's attitude permeates the entire book. Russett is trying to find ways of preventing nuclear war and keeping the peace, but security in the nuclear age cannot be guaranteed by means of the "nuclear intimidation" strategy he endorses. Russett's book represents an attempt to validate a strategic alternative to Reagan Administration policy within the framework of the traditional doctrinal premises of U.S. foreign policy, and it is interesting primarily from this standpoint.

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BOOK ON MILITARY ASPECTS OF AMERICAN IMPERIALISM REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 84 (signed to press 20 Sep 84) pp 117-118

[Review by Yu. V. Katasonov of book "Voyennaya ekonomika amerikanskogo imperializma" [The Military Economy of American Imperialism] by R. A. Faramazyan, Moscow, Mysl', 1983, 240 pages]

[Text] This is the latest work in the author's series of detailed analyses of the economic aspects of contemporary militarism. It shows that the present stage of the arms race, which was started by the United States in the late 1970's and early 1980's and has now acquired unprecedented scales and intensity, is mainly taking the form of the accelerated expansion of militarism's material base--the military economy. Furthermore, not only is the development of the military industry, as the center of this economy, being stepped up, but other sectors of the capitalist economy are undergoing intensive militarization. The arms race is accounting for more and more of the state budget and the social product, while production and personal consumption are accounting for less and less. In the past 7 years the proportion accounted for by military expenditures in the U.S. federal budget rose from 23.4 percent to 28.9 percent, and their proportion of the GNP rose from 5 percent to 7 percent (p 28). The monstrous nature of militarist consumption is reflected in the unproductive waste of colossal resources and human lives in military preparations and undertakings (today the cost of the arms race for the United States is estimated at 2 trillion dollars in the next 5 years).

One of the most important features of the U.S. military economy is that it is being developed with the maximum use of scientific and technical progress for the purpose of the arms race. Military R & D and space R & D projects, which are also of a military nature, accounted for 61.5 percent of all federal R & D expenditures in 1979 and 31.4 percent of total national R & D expenditures (p 60)--a higher percentage than in any other developed capitalist country. The high level of R & D militarization has resulted in the development of new and extremely dangerous weapon systems, and it is the production and deployment of these that constitute the material content of Washington's race for military technology in its pursuit of military superiority.

In recent years the influence of the U.S. military economy has extended far beyond national boundaries. The forms this influence takes include military

and economic aid to foreign states, the arms trade and scientific, technical and production cooperation with the NATO allies. Its scales can be judged merely from the fact that the proportion accounted for by exports in the products of the U.S. military industry rose from 5 percent in the 1960's to 29 percent in 1977 (p 182). The foreign expansion of the American military economy has been particularly helpful in involving dozens of other states, especially developing countries, in the arms race.

R. A. Faramazyan thoroughly analyzes the distinctive features of production relations in the militarized American economy and the effects of militarization on the development of the entire system of U.S. state-monopolist capitalism. The author's precise description of the causes of militarism, particularly the role of the military-industrial complex, warrants attention. This is all the more important because these matters are sometimes given a fairly vague interpretation even in works by Soviet authors. "The development of the U.S. military-industrial complex and its colossal effect on policy and on arms race escalation," R. A. Faramazyan writes, "stem primarily from the fact that the efforts of this complex to maintain and systematically build up American military strength are completely consistent with the general strategic, political and economic interests of the entire monopolist bourgeoisie.... However...the main cause of the development of militarism and the arms race is American imperialism, with its aggressive foreign policy line" (pp 134, 136).

The author's analysis provides conclusive evidence of militarism's extremely adverse effect on economic and social affairs within the United States and on the resolution of many global problems: the eradication of poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy, the need for adequate supplies of energy resources and raw materials, and the protection of the environment.

It appears, however, that the author's precise methodological position with regard to the causes of militarism misleads him in his examination of a matter as important as the economic aspects of arms race limitation and the conversion of military production. In a discussion of the forces opposing this conversion in the United States, he mentions only the military-industrial complex, although the main obstacle is represented by American imperialism in general, its social nature and the economic and political interests it engenders.

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BOOK ON U.S. INTELLECTUAL ELITE REVIEWED

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[Review by V. A. Savel'yev of book "Amerikanskiy kapitalizm i intelligentsiya" [American Capitalism and the Intelligentsia] by V. B. Kuvaldin, Moscow, Nauka, 1983, 366 pages]

[Text] The study of problems connected with the activities of the intelligentsia is particularly important in this era of technological revolution and colossal social changes. It would be difficult and perhaps even impossible to analyze developments in the foreign and domestic policy of American administrations without consideration for the intelligentsia's place and role in American society and, consequently, the new role of culture.

The author defines the intelligentsia as a social stratum consisting of professionals engaged in complex skilled mental labor. In view of the fact that skilled intellectual labor requires a high level of knowledge and a lengthy period of professional training, he uses the terms "intelligentsia," "individuals engaged in mental labor," "representatives of intellectual labor" and "specialists."

V. B. Kuvaldin has set himself the difficult task of revealing the specific events in American history that left their imprint on the spiritual characteristics of the intelligentsia and the distinctive features of its development. His analysis is based on earlier Soviet studies.

Examining the intelligentsia's place in the class structure of the contemporary American society, the author concludes that people engaged in intellectual labor occupy an intermediate, transitional position. On the socioeconomic level they differ little from the majority of hired labor and are close to the working class.

The author points out another fact: The American intelligentsia is part of the hierarchical structure of present-day capitalism but it also has a complex internal structure of its own. It is distinguished by sizeable differences in income levels, career prospects, social positions and, finally, lifestyles (p 127).

The increasingly important role of the intelligentsia, the author says, is evident not only in the production sphere but also in U.S. sociopolitical life. Furthermore, intellectuals have had more influence in social life in the postwar period as a result of the technological revolution and the rapid growth of the intelligentsia: Mental labor is turning into the most important component of the social mechanism.

It is a well-known fact that "think tanks" and research establishments studying current political issues are also playing a more important role. No administration could get along without them, and different "brain trusts" take the forefront depending on the specific political situation. For example, R. Nixon and G. Ford frequently consulted specialists from the American Enterprise Institute, while The Brookings Institution was the main "think tank" under the Carter Administration. The conservative Hoover Institute, the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Institute for Advanced Studies and Heritage Foundation have supplied the Reagan Administration with personnel and ideas.

V. B. Kuvaldin correctly notes that the development of the intelligentsia's sociopolitical outlook is a complex and contradictory process. The rapid growth of the army of intellectual labor and the birth of more and more new subdivisions of this army have kept the intelligentsia from forming a relatively homogeneous social entity. The social and professional diversity of this stratum, the profound differences in the experiences of its individual segments and categories, and the intermediate position it occupies in the bourgeois system of class relations complicate the search for common points of mental reference and turn the intelligentsia into a multifaceted mosaic of present-day capitalism. Despite the continuing process of ideological and political differentiation, most of the intelligentsia still supports and actively promotes bourgeois ideology. Nevertheless, the author feels that the American intelligentsia is turning into the proletariat of mental labor and is participating more noticeably in mass democratic movements. In spite of the inconsistency, hesitancy and ideological limitations of the intellectual opposition, it could expand the antimonopolist front.

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CHRONICLE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS (JUNE-AUGUST 1984)

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 84 (signed to press 20 Sep 84) pp 125-127

[Text] June

1 -- The House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress voted against the allocation of funds for tests of American antisatellite weapons in space as long as the USSR and other countries refrain from conducting such tests.

11-14 -- The fifth and latest colloquium of Soviet and U.S. historians was held in Kiev to discuss "The 50th Anniversary of the Establishment of USSR-U.S. Diplomatic Relations."

12 -- General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium K. U. Chernenko's replies to American journalist J. Kingsbury-Smith's questions were published in PRAVDA.

18 -- A document published by the Democratic Party Platform Committee blamed the Reagan Administration for the general deterioration of American-Soviet relations and contained appeals for talks with the USSR on the prohibition of antisatellite weapons, for a freeze on U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals and for the normalization of relations between the two countries.

In a televised speech, U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger tried to deny a report in the English magazine DEFENSE ATTACHE that the United States organized a spy mission in September 1983 with the use of a South Korean airliner.

20 -- A new organization was formed in the United States to prevent the militarization of space--the Movement To Save the ABM Limitation Treaty.

22-29 -- A delegation from the SSOD [Union of Soviet Friendship Societies] and the "USSR-USA" Society, headed by a member of the society board, Hero of the Soviet Union Col Gen Avn G. F. Baydukov, visited the United States on an invitation from the Chkalov Transpolar Memorial Committee.

24 -- Speaking at a "Conference on International Terrorism" in Washington, U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz brutally attacked the Soviet Union.

30 -- A Soviet Government statement was published, requesting the U.S. Government to commence Soviet-American talks by specially appointed delegates to prevent the militarization of outer space. The Soviet Government simultaneously proposed that a mutual freeze on the testing and deployment of space weapons go into effect on the day these talks begin.

July

2 -- A published TASS statement criticized the U.S. administration's negative reaction to the Soviet Government's proposal of talks on the prevention of the militarization of outer space. The statement rejected Washington's attempts to link this topic with the issue of nuclear arms limitation.

4 -- The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium sent President R. Reagan its congratulations on the American national holiday, Independence Day.

7 -- A second TASS statement was published to reaffirm the Soviet Government's request that the U.S. Government begin official talks on the prevention of the militarization of outer space. The statement stressed that the Soviet Government proposes the negotiation of precisely this topic and no other.

9 -- A press conference was held by representatives of the U.S. public taking a "peace cruise" on the Volga. During the press conference the American guests commended the USSR's recent peace initiatives, particularly the unilateral Soviet pledge not to use nuclear weapons first and the request that the U.S. administration begin negotiating the prevention of the militarization of outer space.

15 -- In a joint report on the "cessation of nuclear proliferation," 15 influential public organizations in the United States asked the Reagan Administration to resume the talks it had broken off with the USSR and Great Britain on a complete and total nuclear test ban.

17 -- As a result of Soviet-American discussions in Moscow and Washington on technical improvements in the existing line of direct communications between the USSR and the United States, an agreement was concluded on the organization of duplication services in addition to the existing telegraph line.

The annual seminar on disarmament and American-Soviet relations was held in the United States. Representatives of public organizations and of political, scientific and religious groups in the United States declared that there is no alternative to the cessation of the arms race and the normalization of U.S.-USSR relations in the nuclear age.

Soviet cosmonauts who participated in the Soyuz-Apollo flight, A. Leonov and V. Kubasov, addressed an open letter to American astronauts T. Stafford, D. Slayton and V. Brand through APN, requesting their colleagues in the joint flight and all participants in the Soviet-American Soyuz-Apollo experiment to keep space peaceful, advocate peaceful "star" cooperation and oppose "star wars."

23 -- The Soviet Government issued an official proposal to the U.S. Government on the publication of a joint Soviet-American report precisely stipulating the consent of the USSR and United States to begin talks for the purpose of drafting and concluding agreements on the prevention of the militarization of space, including the complete mutual renunciation of antisatellite systems, and their consent to institute a mutual freeze on the testing and deployment of space weapons on the day these talks begin.

27 -- A. A. Gromyko received prominent American politician and public spokesman G. McGovern in the Crimea. They discussed aspects of Soviet-American relations, the state of affairs in the sphere of arms limitation and some international issues.

28 -- Another TASS statement was published on the ambiguous U.S. position on the Soviet proposal of 29 June regarding talks to prevent the arms race from spreading to outer space.

The Soviet Association on the Law of the Sea issued a statement condemning the unlawful behavior of the United States in the world ocean, which is escalating international tension and complicating relations between states.

29 -- Soviet proposals were published on the settlement of the Middle East conflict; in particular, they contain an appeal for a new conference on the Middle East under UN auspices, with the participation of Arab countries having common boundaries with Israel, the PLO, and the USSR and United States as states playing an important role in Mideast affairs and as the co-chairmen of the previous conference on the Middle East.

30-2 August -- The second meeting of representatives of the Soviet and American public, organized by the SSOD, the "USSR-USA" Society, the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Washington Institute of Policy Studies, was held in Moscow. Aspects of Soviet-American relations and of disarmament were discussed.

31 -- PRAVDA published an editorial entitled "Washington's Dangerous Illusions," criticizing the U.S. plans to deploy long-range cruise missiles with every form of basing.

August

2 -- At a press conference an official spokesman from the U.S. Department of State rejected the Soviet proposals on Mideast settlement, stating that the United States cannot see any new developments in this sphere.

9 -- The Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace sent telegrams to the U.S. Supreme Court and local courts and to judicial bodies in the FRG to protest the suppression of members of antiwar demonstrations, and telegrams of solidarity to a number of antiwar movements and organizations in the United States and Western Europe, expressing support for the peace advocates who have become the victims of repression.

The American President's national security adviser, R. McFarlane, presented a speech in San Francisco, describing the foreign policy aims of the Reagan Administration and its approach to U.S.-Soviet relations. He brutally attacked the Soviet Union and distorted its foreign policy in this speech.

10 -- Representatives of several American travel agencies resolutely condemned the U.S. State Department announcement that Leningrad is "unsafe" for American tourists.

12 -- General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium K. U. Chernenko's reply to a message from Irish public spokesman S. McBride, reaffirming the USSR's desire for good relations with the United States, was published. This desire must be expressed on both sides. "The Soviet leadership believes," K. U. Chernenko said, "that concrete action, and not words, by the American administration could clear the path for the normalization of our relations with the United States."

13 -- PRAVDA published an article by Academician G. A. Arbatov, "If Not Peace, Then What?" on current problems in Soviet-American relations.

16 -- A TASS statement was published condemning the unprecedented hostility toward the USSR and threat to the cause of peace displayed by the President of the United States when he made a "joke" about outlawing the Soviet Union and bombing it when he was testing the microphone for his latest radio broadcast.

17 -- Addressing a group of Polish-Americans in the White House, Reagan questioned the decisions of the 1945 Crimean conference of the leaders of the USSR, United States and Great Britain and made several hostile remarks about the Soviet Union and Poland.

26 -- The USSR Ministry of Defense announced the successful testing of land-based long-range cruise missiles. The announcement said that the USSR would do everything necessary to achieve genuine arms limitation and reduction, but if the U.S. administration should continue its attempts to achieve military superiority, the USSR will have to continue taking steps of its own to keep the balance of power between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO from being disrupted.

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